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Stern: Stalled Patents: Re-Incentivizing Universities to Review Their Po

NOTE
STALLED PATENTS: RE-INCENTIVIZING
UNIVERSITIES TO REVIEW THEIR PORTFOLIOS
OF UNLICENSED PATENTS TO ACHIEVE THE
BAYH-DOLE ACT'S UNFUNDED MANDATE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The underlying technology and research that enabled Google's
search engine, Gatorade's secret formula, and cell phone technologies
can all be traced back to college campuses across America.' Since World
War II, America's universities-mostly through government research
grants-have been at the forefront of technological innovation.2 It
continues to be in the best interest of the general public that the scientific
breakthroughs occurring in America's collegiate laboratories ultimately
become the building blocks for future companies. 3 As a direct result of
1. See, e.g., Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, LES
NOUVELLES, Dec. 2010, at 185, 188-89 (providing examples of companies that successfully
commercialized technology developed at universities); Google Algorithm Earns $337 Million for
Stanford, IP NAV, http://www.ipnav.com/blog/google-algorithm-eams-337-million-for-stanford
(last visited Apr. 10, 2017); see also Birch Bayh, Senator, Speech at the Licensing Executives
Society Annual Meeting (Sept. 12, 2006), in Birch Bayh, Bayh-Dole: Don't Turn Back the Clock,
LES NOUVELLES, Dec. 2010, at 181, 184 (listing additional technologies discovered by
university scientists). Interestingly, the University of Florida initially elected not to pursue a patent

for the Gatorade formula, enabling the university scientists to obtain a patent themselves.
Zach Kyle, Commercializing Tech Research Has Yet to Fulfill Its Promise, MAGIC VALLEY (June

27, 2015), http://magicvalley.com/news/local/commercializing-tech-research-has-yet-to-fulfill-its
promise/article_4e64c4f8-90d0-57f9-85fc-786e88da2a2e.html. Only after suing the inventors for
breaking a disclosure rule did the University of Florida recapture twenty percent of Gatorade's

royalties. Id.
2.

See, e.g., CHRISTINE M. MATTHEWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41895, FEDERAL

SUPPORT FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH 1 (2012) (discussing the historical importance and success of
federally funded research occurring in universities). Referring to the success of the "Manhattan
Project," the Government established the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of
Health, "establishing the notion of significant government funding for basic research." Dov
Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System
for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311,

336-37 (2009).
3. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Public R&D, PrivateProfits and the American Taxpayer, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2015, at BI (citing MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE:
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legislation-specifically the Bayh-Dole Act-this occurs through
America's complex patent system. 4
The process of transferring scientific discoveries from university
laboratories to the commercial sector is known as technology transfer.'
The Association of University Technology Managers ("AUTM") defines
technology transfer as "the process of transferring scientific findings
from one organization to another for the purpose of further development
and commercialization." 6 However, technology transfer is not cheap;
Senator Bayh, explaining the reasons for a new patent policy in 1980,
stated that the "record showed that for every dollar that was spent on
research, it usually took maybe as high as 9 or 10 dollars in investment
capital-sometimes a million dollars" to commercialize the results of
that research.' Moreover, in many technical fields, most notably
pharmaceuticals and nanotechnology, the process of commercialization
often requires years of dedicated research in order to develop
commercial applications. Very often, the first commercial use of the
technology is ultimately not the best use. 9

&

DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 68-70 (2015) ("Professor Mazzucato notes that
[the American] government often takes the biggest risks, financing early scientific breakthroughs
and providing early support to companies and organization that will eventually become champions
of innovation.")); see also Greenbaum,supra note 2, at 315 & n.4.
4. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2012)).
5. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33527, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: USE
OF FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (2012). Technology transfer can have
different meanings in various parts of industry, but the ultimate goal is uniform: spreading
technology. See id ("Technology transfer is a process by which technology developed in one
organization, in one area, or for one purpose is applied in another organization, in another area, or
for another purpose.").
6. About Technology Transfer, AUTM, https://www.autm.netlautm-info/about-tech-transfer/
about-technology-transfer (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). The organization defines itself as follows:
[A] nonprofit organization with an international membership of more than 3,000
technology managers and business executives. AUTM members-managers of
intellectual property, one of the most active growth sectors of the global economycome from more than 300 universities, research institutions and teaching hospitals as
well as numerous businesses and government organizations.
The Bayh-Dole Act: It's Working, AUTM, https://www.autm.net/AUTMMain/media/Advocacy/
Documents/BayhDoleTalkingPointsFINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
7. See Gene Quinn, Bayh-Dole: A Success Beyond Wildest Dreams, IP WATCHDOG (Sept.
15, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/09/15/bayh-dole-a-success-beyond-wildest-dreams/
id=45171 (quoting Interview with Birch Bayh, Sen., Venable, LLP, Wash., D.C. (Oct. 13, 2010)).
8. Nanotechnology is science, engineering, and technology conducted at the nanoscale,
which is about 1 to 100 nanometers. What is Nanotechnology?, NAT'L NANOTECHNOLOGY
INITIATIVE, http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what/definition (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
Nanoscience and nanotechnology are the study and application of extremely small things and can be
used across all the other science fields, such as chemistry, biology, physics, materials science, and
engineering. Id.
9. Government Patent Policy: Joint Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,
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It was uniformly accepted that prior to 1980, too many governmentfunded inventions--despite many patent approvals-were failing to be
commercialized."o Congress, via the Bayh-Dole Act, hoped to streamline
the commercialization of government-funded research by creating a
uniform patent policy and forcing collaborations between universities
and private industries." By providing (1) universities with an economic
incentive to actively engage in technology transfer and (2) private
industry with exclusive licenses to government-funded technology,
Congress intended to increase the likelihood that the private sector
would invest in the commercialization of government-funded
technology.1 2 It was believed that these incentives ensured Congress's
ultimate goal-the introduction of new products and processes to the
public-would be reached.' 3 In response to Bayh-Dole, many inventions
that would have been "collecting dust on agency shelves" were now
4
being patented and licensed to private industries by universities.' This
was partly because universities, unlike government agencies, have an
economic interest in actively seeking out private assistance to
commercialize government-funded research.'

Transp. and the Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong. 517-19 (1980) [hereinafter Government Patent

Policy] (statement of Monte C. Throdahl, Senior Vice President, Monsanto Co.).
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012). Congress's explicit objective of Bayh-Dole was "to promote
collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities." Id.

Bayh-Dole was enacted to establish uniformity in the vesting of patent rights in inventions resulting
from federally-funded research. S. REP. No. 96-480, at 3 (1979).
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14.
Critics,

See FormerSenator Bayh Calls for Tech-Transfer Community to Educate 'Misinformed'
12, 2007), http://www.genomeweb.com/biotechtransferweek
(Mar.
GENOMEWEB

/former-senator-bayh-calls-tech-transfer-community-educate-misinformed-critics ("In his AUTM
presentation,... Bayh said that before the Bayh-Dole [A]ct, some 96 percent of patents were
'sitting there collecting dust,' and that in the years before the act, there was 'a $30-billion
investment in research that resulted in no return to the taxpayer."').
15. 35 U.S.C. § 202; see also JENNIFER A. HENDERSON & JOHN J. SMITH, ACADEMIA,
INDUSTRY, AND THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: AN IMPLIED DUTY TO COMMERCIALIZE 2, 6 (2002),

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.453.1958&rep=repl&type=pdf ("Prior to
Bayh-Dole, title to scientific inventions arising from federally-funded research typically vested in
the government . .. the policy left the federal government with the responsibility to develop and
commercialize promising technology, functions that it was ill-equipped to perform."); Lorelei
Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress:Are UniversitiesAdding to the Cost?, 43 Hous. L. REV.

1373, 1381-82 (2007) (stating that universities file patent applications more frequently after the
enactment of Bayh-Dole because of the economic incentive that universities receive from licensing
their patent portfolio).
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Although nearly all agree that Bayh-Dole provides a substantial
framework to promote technology transfer, both policymakers and
scholars agree that existing legislation has its limits.16 Congress, the

recent Obama Administration, scholars, and industry leaders consistently
provide general critiques on technology transfer. 7 Nearly all of their
assessments discuss policies to facilitate the transfer of new technology
developed in laboratories today." These reports highlight and critique
new trends in technology transfer such as universities developing
business incubators to assist startups based on university owned

16. See H.R. Con. Res. 328, 111th Cong. (2010) (recognizing the thirtieth anniversary of the
Bayh-Dole Act and reaffirming congressional commitment to the Bayh-Dole Act); WENDY H.
SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32076, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: SELECTED ISSUED IN PATENT
POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 12 (2012) (quoting Scott Shane,
EncouragingUniversityEntrepreneurship?The Effect of the Bayh-Dole Act on University Patenting

in the United States, 19 J. Bus. VENTURING 127, 128 (2004) ("[U]niversities exploit their inventions
primarily through the licensing of technology, and licensing is not equally effective across all
technologies. . .. ")); Michael Sweeney, Comment, Correcting Bayh-Dole's Inefficiencies for the
Taxpayer, 10 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP 295, 296-97 (2012); see also PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF
ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OF
FEDERALLY FUNDED R&D: FINDINGS AND PROPOSED ACTIONS 8-17 (2003) (providing

"recommendations" to improve current technology transfer policies that are currently the "envy of
the world"). Bayh-Dole's effects vary among technology sectors: "Patents are perceived as critical
in the drug and chemical industries in part because of the ease of replicating the finished product.
While it is expensive, complicated, and time consuming to duplicate an airplane, it is relatively
simple to chemically analyze a pill and reproduce it." SCHACHT, supra, at 3 (citing Frederic M.
Scherer, The Economics ofHuman Gene Patents, 77 ACADEMIA MED. 1348, 1350 (2002)).

&

17. See, e.g., Memorandum on Accelerating Technology Transfer and Commercialization
of Federal Research in Support of High-Growth Businesses, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1357
(Oct. 28, 2011) ("[Former President Obama] direct[ed] that the following actions be taken to
establish goals and measure performance, streamline administrative process, and facilitate local and
regional partnerships in order to accelerate technology transfer and support private sector
commercialization."); SCHACHT, supra note 5, at 13-23 (discussing the current issues and concerns
of technology transfer including government recoupment on their investment and potential conflict
of issues that arise on university campuses as a result of the Bayh-Dole Act); see also Sweeney,
supra note 16, at 295-97 (describing the "purpose and problems" of Bayh-Dole in the modem world
including that taxpayers may be paying twice to use technology by initially funding the research and
paying to own the product). As of the publication of this Note, President Donald J. Trump has no
position on technology transfer and commercialization and patent system reform. INFO. TECH.
INNOVATION FOUND., PRESIDENT-ELECT TRUMP'S POSITIONS ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

POLICY 1, 2-3, 3 tbl.2 (2016), http://www2.itiforg/2016-trump-on-tech.pdf
18. See Press Release, Office of Press Sec'y, Exec. Office of the President, Report to
President Calls for Renewed National Focus on Basic Research to Sustain Innovation, Create Jobs
(Nov. 30, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/23/press-releasereport-president-calls-renewed-national-focus-basic ("[I]t will be important to ensure that these
university research programs include a focus on translating discoveries into applications and
products to maintain the cycle of invention and innovation.").
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technology.19 In addition, other reports raise traditional issues that
include (1) whether universities, as patent owners (and business owners)
have a conflict of interest; 20 (2) whether Bayh-Dole was the sole reason
for an increase in university patenting post-1980 or other simultaneous
outside forces were more influential;2 1 and (3) whether new methods to
accurately measure "utilization" could be developed in order to utilize
limited resources more efficiently.2 2 Notably, nearly all solutions related
to issues of technology transfer are centered on requesting additional
government funding that is earmarked for commercialization efforts, 23
which is now occurring more frequently through two inter-agency
19. See Gideon D. Markman et al., Entrepreneurship and University-Based Technology
Transfer, 20 J. Bus. VENTURING 241, 258-60 (2005) (discussing the formation of new university
sponsored venture funds); see also J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed
Research Commons for Scientific Datain a Highly ProtectionistIntellectual PropertyEnvironment,

LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2003, at 317, 341-43 ("As the costs of education skyrocket, and
government funding fails to keep up in many areas, universities have aggressively sought to exploit
commercial applications of research results, with an eye toward maximizing returns on
investment.").
20.

See DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF

HIGHER EDUCATION 66-71 (2003) (discussing how corporations create conflicts of interest on
research campuses); Charles R. McManis & Brian Yagi, The Bayh-Dole Act and the Anticommons
Hypothesis: Round Three, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1049, 1059-76 (2014) (debating the impact of
Bayh-Dole on the research mission of U.S. universities and whether providing incentives for
universities to commercialize research is threatening "curiosity-driven" research); Liza Vertinsky,
Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949, 1976 (discussing the
boundaries between the production of fundamental knowledge, the traditionally claimed domain of
the university, and commercial application, the supposed domain of the private sector).
21. See David C. Mowery et al., The Growth ofPatentingand Licensing by US. Universities:
An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL'Y, 99, 103-04 (2001)
(inquiring whether other factors were the cause of the increase in university patenting post the
enactment of Bayh-Dole); Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th

Century: The World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL'Y 772, 783-84 (2006) (discussing
that new technologies relating to DNA and biotechnology in general may have spurred a growth in
patenting by universities with or without Bayh-Dole).
22. See Memorandum from Shaun Donovan, Dir., Office of Management & Budget, & John
P. Holdren, Dir., Office of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, to the Heads of Execs. Dep'ts & Agencies 2, 4-5
(July 9, 2015) (on file with author) (requiring for the fiscal year 2017 budget for agencies to develop
"meaningful, measurable, and quantitative metrics where possible and describe how they plan to
evaluate the success of [technology transfer]"); see also Brian Cummings, The ChangingLandscape
of Intellectual Property Management as a Revenue-Generating Asset for US.

Research

Universities, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1027, 1042-46 (2014) (showing that there are no "effective
metrics" to gauge the quantitative results of transfer technology offices).
23. See Loise & Stevens, supra note 1, at 193-94 ("We need to find creative new sources of
funding [commercialization]."); Walter D. Valdivia, University Start-Ups: Criticalfor Improving
Technology Transfer, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS, Nov. 2013, at 1, 15,

16 figs.1 & 2, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ValdiviaTech-Transfer
v29_No-Embargo.pdf (finding that the federal government should increase funding for programs
that are exclusively directed at commercializing government-funded research); see also
Memorandum from Donovan & Holdren, supra note 22, at 4-5 ("Agency budget proposals should
prioritize and highlight contributions to the Lab-to-Market Cross-Agency Priority Goal . . . .").
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programs.2 4 Notably, these funds are typically only applied to the
commercialization technologies being developed in laboratories today.2 5
However, today, just as before the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act,
government-funded research with potential commercial applications is
still underutilized.2 6 In fact, "most university inventions are never picked
up by a licensee." 27 Without a successful licensing agreement-which is
the only method permitted to transfer technology to private industry
under Bayh-Dole 2 8-the
taxpayers' investment is being "wasted." 29
Thus, instead of government-funded inventions "collecting dust" on
agency shelves, as was the case prior to Bayh-Dole, today, many
inventions are "collecting dust" on university shelves.30 As a
result, taxpayers are not receiving the full return on their investment
as the Bayh-Dole Act promised-new and innovative products in
the marketplace.3 1
Bayh-Dole is an unfunded mandate, requiring universities to
commercialize technology without providing funds.3 2 Compounding the
problem is that agency grants do not typically include funds earmarked
for commercialization, so the university must either supply the funds
itself or partner with the private sector.33 Even further, the limited funds

24. See Loise & Stevens, supranote 1, at 192. Two inter-agency programs were created in the
1970s to fund companies based on government sponsored research: the Small Business Technology
Transfer Program ("STTR") and the Small Business Innovation Research Program ("SBIR"). Birth
& History of the SBIR Program, SBIR/STTR, https://www.sbir.gov/birth-and-history-of-the-sbirprogram (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). Collectively known as "America's Seed Fund," each program
requires government agencies that fund scientific research to set aside a percentage of their budgets
to help fund startup companies based on government sponsored research. Id. "[T]he SBIR and
STTR Programs are affiliated with government agencies involving research and development with
an extramural budget of $100 Million dollars or more." Id Today "the SBIR and STTR Programs
now have 2.2 billion dollars set aside annually to support the financing of cutting-edge technologies
developed by small businesses." Id.
25. See Markman et al., supra note 19, at 244-45, 250-51 (discussing universities' practices
for licensing basic research).
26. S. REP. No. 96-480, at 27-28 (1979) (discussing that it is a "waste of public money" to
have inventions that are patented by the federal government but not licensed to private industry).

27. See de Larena, supra note 15, at 1381-82, 1381 n.50 (citing Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH.
MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: 2004 15, 21-24 (2005) (discussing a study by the
AUTM that "roughly 28.6% of processed invention reports are licensed")).
28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (2012). Notably, 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) only applies to universities
and other non-profits who accept research money from the federal government. Id.
29. S. REP. No. 96-480, at 27-28.
30. See FormerSenator Bayh Callsfor Tech-Transfer Community to Educate 'Misinformed'
Critics, supra note 14; infra Part III.

31. 35 U.S.C. § 200; see de Larena, supranote 15, at 1387 ("[I]f universities misuse research
funds, bungle licensing deals, or simply overlook important technologies that are vested in them by
the Bayh-Dole Act, then taxpayers are not receiving that deserved benefit.").
32. 35 U.S.C. § 200.
33.

Irene Abrams et al., How Are US. Technology Transfer Offices Tasked and Motivated-Is
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available are earmarked for the new technology that is constantly
appearing on university campuses. 34 This Note proposes an amendment
to Bayh-Dole that will both incentivize and enable universities to review
their portfolio of unlicensed patents for technologies with new
commercial applications." In order to receive any new economic grants,
a university must demonstrate a method to review their unlicensed
portfolio. 36 The amendment only applies to "Stalled Patents," defined
herein as (1) government-funded technology of which the university
elects to obtain ownership by patenting and (2) that, after five years,
either were never licensed to private industry or the initial licensing deal
failed and the rights were returned to the university.3 7 In other words, a
Stalled Patent is any patent that, after five years, is collecting dust on the
shelves of a university. 38
The proposed amendment supports a pilot program that provides,
inter alia, economic support for universities to reexamine Stalled
Patents, which would result in a second, serious effort to find new
commercial applications of taxpayer-funded technology.39 Further, it
would permit universities to utilize proceeds from licensing agreements
to cover budget shortfalls, which may result in universities taking a more
active approach to licensing Stalled Patents. Currently, there is little to
no chance that Stalled Patents will be commercialized.40 The limited
funds supplied to each university's technology transfer office ("TTO")
are often exclusively dedicated to the patenting and commercialization
efforts of new technology being developed on campuses today.41 Thus,
in the current environment, Stalled Patents represent a waste of
taxpayers' significant investment.42
One of the noticeable benefits of the Bayh-Dole Act is that research
universities began to "scour their laboratories" seeking technology with
potential commercial applications.43 Now, in addition, universities will
It All About the Money?, RES. MGMT. REV., Fall/Winter 2009, at 18, 24-27 (discussing the budgets
of technology transfer offices at universities).
34. See infra Part Ill.
35.
36.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.

37. The term "Stalled Patents" was created for the purposes of this Note. Essentially, the goal
is to include any patent under the control of the TTO that is unlicensed to private industry after five
years. This includes patents that were never licensed, or situations where the initial licensing deal
failed and the patent rights returned to the TTO. See infra Part IV.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

IV.
IV.
III.
Il.
111.
I.B.I.
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also actively review their existing portfolio, which will result in the
commercialization of Stalled Patents." The ultimate effect will be a
bona fide second effort that taxpayer-funded technology yields new
products and innovations for society.4 5 Encouragingly, the potential
commercial applications for many inventions increase over time,
creating new commercial opportunities for Stalled Patents.46
The Bayh-Dole Act is applicable to non-profit organizations,
government-owned facilities, small businesses, and corporations that
receive federal funding for research.4 7 Universities and other non-profits
are treated differently under Bayh-Dole than other entities.48 Thus, the
scope of this Note only extends to universities that receive federal
funding for research purposes. Part II provides a brief historical
overview of the events leading to Bayh-Dole's enactment and a thorough
analysis of all relevant provisions under the Act, and it explores the
goals of technology transfer.49 Part III describes a limitation of BayhDole-specifically that it is inevitable that inventions subject to BayhDole become Stalled Patents, thereby wasting some of the taxpayers'
enormous investment in science and technology."o Part IV proposes an
amendment to Bayh-Dole that provides an incentive and funded pilot
program for universities to search their existing patent portfolios for new
commercial applications, ensuring that they mount a significant second
effort to commercialize Stalled Patents.
II.

THE BAYH-DOLE ACT AND THE BIRTH OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Although the current industry term commonly referred to as
technology transfer can trace its roots to 1980 with the enactment of
the Bayh-Dole Act, the concept of universities applying science to
solve real-life issues dates back to the early 1900s. 52 A famous, early
example of American university innovation is the "Manhattan Project."5 3
44. See infra Part IV.
45. See infra PartIV.
46. See infra Part IV.
47. 35 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
48. Id
49. See infra Part II.
50. See infra Part III.
51. See infra Part IV.
52. Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 333-36 (stating that the Bayh-Dole Act is often credited for
spawning the patent culture within American universities, however, some universities began
patenting research as early as 1925). The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation was established
in 1925 to manage the licensing of the research coming out of the University of Wisconsin at
Madison. Id. at 335-36.
53. Steve Koppes, How the First Chain Reaction Changed Science, UNIV. CHI.,
www.uchicago.edu/features/how-the-first-chain-reaction-changed science (last visited Apr. 10,
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Recognizing that "the research capacity of colleges and universities was
significantly important to [America's] long-term national interests," after
World War II, the government began to aggressively fund research at
universities around the nation.5 4
By 1980, the federal government was investing billions of dollars a
year to support research and development." Government funds
supported basic research-research that is conducted without specific
applications in mind-that remained unattractive for businesses to
pursue despite the potential for improving economic growth and the
people's well-being." Congress understood it was inevitable, and
possibly very beneficial to society, that government-funded research
would produce patentable inventions. 57 In fact, throughout the 1970s,
various agencies were obtaining patents on government-funded research
with no economic incentive to commercialize the new technology." As a
result, before Bayh-Dole, about ninety-five percent of government2017) (discussing how researchers at the University of Chicago and the University of California,
Berkeley contributed to the development of the atomic bomb). For a brief history of university
scientists and government officials collaborating to create the atomic bomb, see ManhattanProject,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, www.britannica.com/event/Manhattan-Project (last visited Apr. 10,

2017).
54.

CHRISTINE M. MATHEWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41895, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR

&

ACADEMIC RESEARCH 1 (2012) (citing Letter from Vannevar Bush, Dir., Office of Research
Dev., to Harry Truman, U.S. President (July 25, 1945), www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf5O/vbushl945.htm).
Vannever Bush was the national science advisor to both Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry
Truman. Letter from Bush, supra; Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, to Vannevar

Bush, Dir., Office of Research & Dev. (Nov. 17, 1944); see Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 336-38
("In arguably one of the most important science pronouncements of the 20th century, Bush called
for, among other things, the establishment of a centralized government funding source for
research ... establishing the notion of significant government funding for basic research."). Bush's
urging directly led to the formation of both the National Science Foundation and the National
Institute of Health. Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 336-38.

55. SCHACHT, supra note 16, at 1-2 (providing a historical perspective on the passing of
Bayh-Dole).
56. Id. at 2. The Association of American Universities provides:
The innovations that have improved the country's productivity and quality of life are
ultimately grounded in the results of basic research. Basic research is the part of the
research and development (R&D) that contributes to our fundamental stock of
knowledge, yet is conducted without specific applications in mind. Despite its value to
society as a whole, basic research is underfunded by private firms precisely because it is
performed with no specific commercial applications in mind. Instead, businesses have an
incentive to concentrate their R&D spending on the development of products or
processes with direct commercial value.
U.S.

CONG. JOINT

ECON.

COMM.,

THE PIVOTAL

ROLE

OF

GOVERNMENT

INVESTMENT

IN BASIC RESEARCH (2010), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/2b3adec5-b9b3-449c82f8-1f92a3749b71/jec-r-d-report.pdf.
57. S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 2-3 (1979). The U.S. government held legal title to all patents that
arose from federally funded research, but multiple agencies had funding authority and each one had
its own policy to deal with private parties and intellectual property rights. Id
58. Id. at 1-3.
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owned patents were never licensed by the private sector, despite many
patents having significant commercial potential. 9
During the 1970s, "many in Congress were of the opinion that
additional [commercial] applications could be pursued by the private
sector if [the private sector was] provided the proper incentives.""o
Subpart A discusses the issues and rationale that led to the joint
congressional support and passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.6 Next,
Subpart B discusses Congress' explicit and implicit policies for passing
Bayh-Dole and the applicable provisions.6 2 Finally, Subpart C introduces
the TTO,63 a specialized entity on university campuses that manages the
complex process of commercializing government-funded discoveries
that occur on university campuses.64
A.

Before the Bayh-Dole Act: Government-FundedInventions
CollectedDust on Agency Watch

By the late 1970s, many in government felt that the failure of
American industry to keep pace with foreign industries was, in part, due
to government patent policy. 65 In the only report to Congress discussing
Bayh-Dole, Senator Bayh stated:
Evidence is mounting that the United States is falling behind its
international competition in the development of new products and
59. Id. at 2.
60.

See SCHACHT, supra note 16, at 2; HENDERSON & SMITH, supra note 15, at 2 ("Overall,

this pre Bayh-Dole paradigm produced an environment where federally-funded research
infrequently led to viable products or services.").
61. See infra Part I.A.
62. See infra Part II.B.
63. See infra Part I.C. TTOs are also referred to as Technology Licensing Offices or
Technology Ventures Offices. See, e.g., About Research at Penn State, PENN ST., http://www.

research.psu.edulovpr (last visited Apr. 10, 2017); Mission, COLUM., http://techventures.columbia.
edulmission (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
64.

Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, THE AUTM BRIEFING BOOK: 2015, at 5 (2015), http://

www.autmvisitors.net/sites/default/files/documents/AUTM%20Briefing%2Book%202015.pdf.
65. S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 2-3 (1979). In 1980, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Representative Robert Kastenmeier stated that:

The crisis in U.S. productivity and the governmental role in it has not gone unnoticed,
however. In May of 1978 the President called for a major policy review of industrial
innovation as the key to increased productivity in the United States. . . . These
recommendations, in turn, were received by the President, and formed the basis of a
major legislative proposal which was conveyed to the Congress. Special emphasis was
placed on the role of the patent system and the patent policy regarding funded research in
promoting industrial innovation. . . . Both [universities and small businesses] lack the
resources to cope with the bewildering regulatory and bureaucratic problems associated
with transfer of patent rights pursuant to government contracts; and the university sector
in particular is an important link to the private sector.

H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 1-2 (1980).
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inventions .... One factor that can be clearly identified as a part of
this problem is the inability of Federal agencies to deliver new
inventions and processes from their research and development
programs to the marketplace where they can benefit the public. A
prime cause of this failure is the existence of ineffective patent policies
regarding ownership of potentially important discoveries. 66
Before Bayh-Dole, agencies acquired the patent rights to federally
funded research by default." Prior to 1980, private industry licensed and
developed only five percent of the nearly 28,000 patents owned by the
government. 68 Over 26,000 patents-covering cutting edge biology,
pharmaceuticals, and computing technologies with enormous potentialremained significantly underutilized.69 Even more troubling, "of that five
percent only an infinitesimally small number led to a commercial
product."70 Thus, taxpayers were essentially receiving no return on their
investment, which funded both the initial technology and the expense of
patenting that technology.7 1
This underutilization was mainly attributable to three factors. First,
it was unclear to the private sector which entity would own the
intellectual property rights. 72 At that time, there were at least twenty-four
different patent policies effective in government agencies funding
scientific research.73 in some instances, agencies permitted universities

66.
67.

S. REP. No. 96-480, at 1-2.
Id. at 2-3.

68.

Id.; see also SCHACHT, supra note 16, at 2. But see Sampat, supra note 21, at 780-81

(questioning the study that produced the five percent statistic because the patents cited in this study
were based primarily on research funded by the U.S. Defense Department, and it is more likely that
the lack of licensing was primarily because the patents had little or no commercial potential).
69. See S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 2; Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Tech Transfer: Everything
(Patent)Is Never Quite Enough, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 843, 848 (2010) (citing Terry A. Young,
Technology Transferfrom US Universities: The Need to Value IP at the Point of Commercialsation,
in VALUING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN JAPAN, BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES 24 (Ruth

Taplin ed., 2004)).
70. Gibbons, supra note 69, at 848.
71. S. REP.No. 96-480, at 2-3 (1979).
72. See id. at 1-3 (arguing that even when private industries reached out to agencies, their
complicated licensing procedures made it very difficult on industry). In 2005, former Senator Bayh
explained the lack of technology transfer prior to the Bayh-Dole Act:
The problem was that whenever federal dollars went into research-as almost all of our
universities were getting federal grants to do research-and any ideas that were
developed from those dollars, those grants, the patents that were secured were owned by
the government and no private individual or company could get access to them.
Quinn, supra note 7 (quoting Interview with Bayh, supra note 7).

73. S. REP. No. 96-480, at 2; HENDERSON & SMITH, supra note 15, at 2 ("[S]pecific details of
patent policy were left to the various agencies funding federal research, leading to significant
variation in the policy actually applied in individual cases.").
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to obtain title to government-funded research, but that occurred on an
agency-by-agency basis or via case-by-case petitions.74
Second, the different patent policies led to complicated and limited
licensing procedures, sometimes even within the same agency.75
Primarily, agencies offered only non-exclusive licenses to private
partners. 76 Since the cost of commercialization is often ten-fold the cost
of the invention, 7 7 "it was widely argued that without title (or at least an
exclusive license) to an invention and the protection [that] it convey[ed],
a company would not invest the additional, and often substantial time
and money necessary to commercialize a product or process for the
marketplace." 78 Unless an exclusive license was obtained, any
competitor could obtain a license and piggyback off any further
developments that occurred.79
Finally, the agencies had neither a legal duty nor an economic
incentive to license patents to industry." Agencies adopted a very
passive approach for licensing technology to the private sector." As a
result of these three factors, "over 90 percent of all Government patents
[were] not used."8 2 In essence, quality and potentially society-altering
technology "collected dust" on agencies' shelves and private industry
remained unwilling to license government-funded technology.83 In the
years before the Bayh-Dole Act, Senator Bayh stated that there was
"a $30 billion investment in research that resulted in no return to
the taxpayer." 84
74. See S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 2; Sampat, supranote 21, at 777-78.
75. S. REP. No. 96-480, at 2 (arguing that even when private industries reached out to
agencies, their complicated licensing procedures made it very difficult on industry).
76.

See SCHACHT, supra note 16, at 2.

77.

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 96-480, at 19.

78. SCHACHT, supra note 16, at 2. In the business community, non-exclusive licenses are
generally viewed as having no patent protection. See S. REP. No. 96-480, at 18; Government Patent

Policy, supra note 9, at 466 (statement of Dr. Jordan J. Baruch, Assistant Secretary for Science and
Technology, Department of Commerce) ("The willingness of industry to develop those inventions
and to commercialize them depends on industry's ability to earn a satisfactory return on those

investments, recognizing their often highly risky nature, before others can copy cheaply what they
have produced at such risk and expense.").
79. Gibbons, supra note 69, at 848 (quoting Young, supra note 69, at 25) ("Companies were
loath to invest in commercialization of government owned patents because as one commenter
quipped 'what is available to everyone is of interest to no one."'); see, e.g., Scherer, supra note 16,
at 1350-52 (highlighting that the cost of reverse engineering a pharmaceutical drug is a fraction of
the cost of developing it).
80. See S. REP. No. 96-480, at 2-3.
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 18.
83.

Former Senator Bayh Calls for Tech-Transfer Community to Educate 'Misinformed'

Critics, supra note 14; see also S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 18; Gibbons, supranote 69, at 848.
84. Former Senator Bayh Calls for Tech-Transfer Community to Educate 'Misinformed'
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The Bayh-Dole Act: A Uniform Patent Policy Since 1980

The U.S. Constitution provides the foundation for America's patent
system: "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 8 The First Congress
executed that power by enacting the Patent Act of 1790. In 1980,
Congress once again flexed this muscle. 7
1. The Bayh-Dole Act's Explicit and Implicit Policies
and Objectives
Congress explicitly details the policies and objectives of Bayh-Dole

as codified in 35 U.S.C. § 200:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system
to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally
supported research or development; . . . to promote collaboration
between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including
universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations
and small business firms are used in a manner to promote free
competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future
research and discovery; [and] to promote the commercialization and
public availability of inventions made in the United States by United
States industry and labor; to ensure that the Government obtains
sufficient rights in the federally supported inventions to meet the needs
of the government and protect the public against nonuse or
unreasonable use of inventions .8.. 8
The overarching theme of Bayh-Dole is to "promote the utilization"
of government-funded technology in order to benefit the public.89 BayhDole was based on the fact that the benefits to the public from invention
stem from its use.90 Congress sought to accomplish these policies and
Critics, supra note 14.

85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
86. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112, repealedby Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat,
318-323. The Act provided "[t]hat upon the petition of any person or persons ... setting forth, that
he, she or they, hath or have invented or discovered" an invention, a patent could be granted to
"such petition or petitioners" or "their heirs, administrators or assigns." Id. "Although much in
intellectual property law has changed in the 220 years since the first Patent Act, the basic idea that
inventors have the right to patent their inventions has not." Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 785 (2011).
87. See Patent Rights in Inventions Made with Federal Assistance, ch. 38, 94 Stat. 3019-29
(1980) (codified as amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2012)).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 200.
89. Id.
90.

See Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Stats as Innovation System Laboratories: California, Patents,

and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDozo L. REv. 1133, 1141 (2006) ("The primary purpose of the
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objectives by providing a uniform patent policy for government-funded
92
research.9 1 Via its simple provisions-and one Supreme Court case -it
is very clear which entity owns title to government-funded research and
93
what happens if that entity chooses not to take ownership.
Congress provided economic incentives for universities as well as
inventor-scientists to participate in the process of technology transfer,
which Congress understood would encourage universities to
commercialize basic research.94 First, expanding patent policies would
properly motivate universities to "mount a serious effort to help the
public gain a greater return on the billions of tax dollars invested in
academic research."" In fact, it was expected that the "potential profits
from patents [would] 'keep scores of institutions scouring their labs for
commercially valuable innovations."' 96
Second, policymakers realized that when government agencies
retained title to inventions there was little incentive for the inventor to
remain involved in the commercialization of the technology. 97 In fact,
Bayh-Dole Act is to ensure that government-funded inventions are commercialized, and thus allow
the public to benefit from those inventions.").
91. See 35 U.S.C. § 200; S. REP. No. 96-480, at 26-27 (1979) ("S.414 deals with this problem
by establishing a uniform legislative policy that will override conflicting statutes."); see, e.g., April
L. Butler, Case Note, Stealing Thunderfrom Government Contractors: Thwarting the Intent of the

Bayh-Dole Act in Campbell Plastics v. Brownlee, 31 U. DAYTON L. REv. 477, 490 (2006) ("The
[Bayh-Dole] Act created a uniform patent policy for federally funded inventions .... ). But see
Government Patent Policy, supra note 9, at 463 (statement of Russell B. Long, U.S. Senator for

Louisiana) (arguing that a uniform patent policy must be initiated, but that title of federally funded
inventions must reside with the entity that pays for it-the government).
92. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776,
776 (2011). For a complete discussion of the implications of Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., see infra
note 117.
93. 35 U.S.C. § 202.
94. Markman et al., supra note 19, at 244-45 ("Hence, where in the past universities have
passively licensed their technologies today many research universities actively search for ways to
channel proprietary technology to maximize rents and to spawn new companies."); see also Risa L.
Lieberwitz, The Marketing ofHigher Education: The Price ofthe University's Soul, 89 CORNELL L.

REV. 763, 780-82 (2004) (reviewing BOK, supra note 20). Senator Bayh and Senator Birch each
believed in a Jeffersonian ideal that the "best thing government could do to provide incentives for
success was get out of the way of these individuals." Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of BayhDole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 94 (2004). Competing views include a Hamiltonian belief that a
strong central government should manage resources and a populist view that the government could
only hurt technology transfer but should ensure that everyone benefits financially from government
efforts. Id.
95. Lieberwitz, supranote 94, at 781-82.
96. Id. (quoting BOK, supra note 20, at 77). But see Scott Shane, Stop Pushing Universities to
License More Inventions, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 29, 2012, 6:57 PM), www.bloomberg.com/bw/

(arguing that stronger
articles/2012-02-29/stop-pushing-universities-to-license-more-inventions
incentives to commercialize do not suddenly make university inventions more valuable to the
marketplace).
97. S. REP. No. 96-480, at 22 (1979).
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"[v]irtually all experts in the innovation process stress very strongly that
such involvement by the inventor is absolutely essential, especially when
the invention was made under basic research where it is invariably in the
embryonic stage of development." 98 Congress accomplished this by
requiring universities to share royalties with the inventor-scientist. 99
Congress accepted the argument, and history seems to vindicate,
that the prospect of earning royalties would make universities work
harder to identify commercially promising discoveries in their
laboratories.'o Consistent with traditional values-that revenue from
research should be utilized to fund further research' 01 -universities must
invest to further research and education.102 However, the Bayh-Dole Act
does not provide universities an unlimited property right to research
funded by taxpayers. 10 3 In return for the ability to patent and profit from
federally funded research, universities are required to relinquish certain
rights to which a patent holder is typically entitled.10 4
2. The Bayh-Dole Act's Provisions: The Ownership Waterfall
Bayh-Dole was passed by a lame duck Congress on December 12,
1980, with minimal floor debate."0 ' At the time of its enactment, it was

9 8. Id.
99. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B) (2012).
100. See BOK, supranote 20, at 77, 141.
101. See id. (discussing the formation of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation in 1925).
Henry Steinbeck, a professor at the University of Wisconsin, donated his lucrative patent for
irradiating milk to the University of Wisconsin to create a foundation to fund research. Id.
102. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(C).
103. See infra Part II.B.2-4.
104. See infra Part II.B.2-4.
105. Sampat, supra note 21, at 780. Bayh-Dole was ultimately signed into law as part of House
Bill 6933 of the 96th Congress. See Patent and Trademark Laws, Amendment, ch. 30, 94 Stat. 301518 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). Bayh-Dole originated as Senate
Bill 414, introduced by Senators Birch Bayh and Robert Dole. SEAN O'CONNOR ET AL.,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, LEGAL CONTEXT OF UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 16-17 (2010), sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/
webpage/pga_058897.pdf. Prior to enactment, the text of Senate Bill 414 was used to replace all
relevant original text of House Resolution 6933 in an amendment-by-substitution procedure. Id. The
first five sections dealt with the procedures of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id
Section 6 related to government-funded inventions and subsequently became known as Bayh-Dole.
Id. Unlike House Resolution 6933, Bayh-Dole originally applied only to non-profits, universities,
and small businesses. Id; see 35 U.S.C. § 202(a). This narrowing of scope eased the concerns of
both consumer advocates and antitrust attorneys fearing monopolies for large corporations. See
Vanessa Bell, Note, The State Giveth and the State Taketh Away: Patent Rights Under the BayhDole Act, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J., 491, 502-03 (1983). Regardless, Bayh-Dole was extended to
large and for-profit businesses several years later by President Ronald Reagan via an executive
order. Memorandum from Ronald Reagan, U.S. President to the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies (Feb. 18, 1983), www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40945. The Executive Order
stated:
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applauded-and still is-for its simple language and honorable goals. 106
All "subject inventions"l 07 performed by a university under a federal
"funding agreement,"os whether funded entirely or partially by the
government, are subject to Bayh-Dole.' 09 This includes both inventions
conceived under federal funding but reduced to practice at the inventor's
personal expense and inventions conceived long before a government
contract if put to practice during the course of the contract.1 10
The written funding agreement requires universities"' to (1)
"disclose each subject invention to the [relevant] Federal agency within
a reasonable time";112 (2) "make a written election within two years after
disclosure to the Federal agency"113 stating it is electing to take title to
the subject invention; and (3) "file a patent application subject to any
statutory bar date."ll 4 Notably, "the Federal government may receive
title to any subject invention" when either the university does not elect to
retain rights or fails to comply with any of these ongoing obligations."'
If neither the university nor the government elects title to a subject
To the extent permitted by law, agency policy with respect to the disposition of any
invention made in the performance of a federally-funded research and development
contract, grant or cooperative agreement award shall be the same or substantially the
same as applied to small business firms and nonprofit organizations under Chapter 38 of
Title 35 of the United States Code.
Id.
106.
107.
actually
§ 201(e)

See de Larena, supranote 15, at 1377-86 (describing the noble intent of the drafters).
"[S]ubject invention" is defined as "any invention of the [university] conceived or first
reduced to practice in the performance of work under a funding agreement." 35 U.S.C.
(2012).

108. The term "funding agreement" is defined as "any contract, grant, or cooperative
agreement entered into between any Federal agency ... and Contractor for the performance of

experimental, developmental, or research work funded in whole or in part by the Federal
Government." Id § 201(b).
109. Id. §§ 201(b), 202(a).
110. See id. § 201(b). The provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act "shall take precedence over any
other Act which would require a disposition of rights in subject inventions of [universities] in a
manner that is inconsistent with this chapter." Id. § 210(a).
111. Bayh-Dole applies to "contractor[s]," defined as "any person, small business firm, or
nonprofit organization that is a party to a funding agreement." Id. § 201(c) (emphasis added).
Non-profit organizations include any "universities and other institutions of higher education." Id.
§ 201(i).
112. Id. § 202(c)(1).
113. Id. § 202(c)(2).
114. Id. § 202(c)(3).
115. Id. If a university fails to properly disclose a subject invention in accordance with
35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1), the government has discretion in determining whether to "demand title."
Campbell Plastics Eng'g & Mfg. v. Brownlee, 389 F.3d 1243, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The
government does not need to show "harm" in order to invoke forfeiture. Id. As established in GenProbeInc. v. Centerfor Neurologic Study, 853 F. Supp. 1215, 1217-18 (S.D. Cal. 1993) and Platzer
v. Sloan-Kettering Institutefor Cancer Research, 787 F. Supp. 360, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), there is
no private right of action under 35 U.S.C. § 202.
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invention, then the inventor-scientist may elect to obtain rights to
the research.' 16

In its only interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act, the Supreme Court
in 2011 held that title to a subject invention under Bayh-Dole does not
automatically vest to the university.117 Instead, like any normal entity, a
university must first obtain rights from the inventor-scientist (or
employee) via an assignment-a typical requirement of any employment
agreement, even within academia."' Thus, a university must (1) obtain
ownership of the invention from the inventor(s) via assignment(s) and
(2) elect to obtain ownership in accordance with the provisions of BayhDole.1 19 Interestingly, Bayh-Dole's provisions do more than merely
determine ownership of government-funded research. 120
3. The Bayh-Dole Act's Provisions: Universities' Legal
Obligations Begin Once They Elect Ownership
The legal obligations placed on universities by Bayh-Dole do not
subside once a university obtains a patent on a subject invention. 121 The
"practical effect of Sections 202 and 203 is that [universities] must
actively pursue commercialization, through the development and
eventual public availability of inventions to which they have elected to

116. 35 U.S.C. § 202(d).
117. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776,
786 (2011). In Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., a dispute arose over ownership of a patent covering a
diagnostic test for HIV developed by a scientist employed by Stanford University. Id. at 780-82.
Prior to invention, the Stanford scientist visited a private company, and in doing so, signed an
agreement assigning any new ideas developed from his visit to the company. Id. Finding for the
private company, the U.S. Supreme Court held that patents have always vested in the inventor, and
that ownership is determined by the inventor's assignment. Id. at 785-86. Thus, to be a "subject

invention" under Bayh-Dole, the university must first acquire title by a proper assignment. Id. at
786-93.
118. Id
119. 35 U.S.C. § 202.
120. See infra Part II.B.3.
121. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-203; HENDERSON & SMITH, supra note 15, at 5. Describing the
congressional negotiations of the Bayh-Dole Act:
The principles of the Bayh-Dole Act were the result of years of intense and emotional
debate, dealing with fundamental concerns. The record shows that the debate included
such issues as whether exclusive licenses would lead to monopolies and higher prices;
whether taxpayers would get their fair share; whether foreign industry would benefit

unduly; and whether ownership of inventions by a contractor is anti-competitive.
Safeguards were hammered out in numerous legislative drafts. It is certain that the Act
became much stronger because of the thorough debate that took place prior to its
passage.
The Bayh-Dole Act: A Guide to the Law and Implementing Regulations, COUNCIL ON
GOVERNMENTAL REL. 1, 3 (1999), http://www.umventures.org/sites/umventures.com/files/COGR_

BayhDole.pdf.
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retain title" or risk government intervention. 12 2 One argument against the
Bayh-Dole Act was that taxpayer funded research is being "given" to
universities, and "once the monopoly is given to the [university], the
public will be unable to find out what has happened to the results of the
research it paid for." 1 23 Also, there were many in Congress who felt that
"inventions should belong to those who pay to have them created,"
meaning the government or the taxpayers themselves. 124
For those opposing Bayh-Dole, "[o]ne of the great concerns of the
time was that dominant companies might license university inventions
with the deliberate purpose of suppressing them if they threatened
existing products."l 25 To appease these dissenters and "prevent any
undesirable economic concentration," the drafters of Bayh-Dole built in
several protectionist provisions.1 2 6 First, the specific "federal agency" 2 7
that provides funding obtains the right to "require periodic reporting
on the utilization or efforts obtaining utilization that are being made
by the [university] or his licensees." 28 Second, the government retains
a "grant-back right"' 2 9 on every invention developed using federal
funds.' 3 0 That right secures the federal government a "nonexclusive,
nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have
practiced for or on behalf of the United States . . throughout
the world."'3 1
Third, to ensure a maximum benefit to the public, drafters included
a federal "march-in right." 3 2 If a university "has not taken, or is not
expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve
practical application of the subject invention" the government may
invoke its march-in right.' 33 Under this provision, agencies can require a
122.

See HENDERSON & SMITH, supranote 15, at 5.

123.

Government PatentPolicy, supra note 9, at 463-64 (statement of Russell B. Long, U.S.

Senator for Louisiana).

124.

Id. at 463.

125. Joseph Allen, Advice for the Trump Administration and New Congress: ProtectBayhDole and Restore the Patent System, IP WATCHDOG (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
90

&

.

2016/12/06/trump-administration-congress-protect-bayh-dole-restore-patent-system/id=752
126. S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 28 (1979); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-203 (2012); HENDERSON
SMITH, supranote 15, at 4-5.

127. The term "federal agency" is defined as "any executive agency as defined in section 105
of title 5, and the military departments as defined by section 102 of title 5." 35 U.S.C. § 201(a).
128. Id. § 202(c)(5). However, any information obtained under this provision shall be treated
by the federal agency as "commercial and financial information obtained from a person and
privileged and confidential and not subject to disclosure." Id.
129.

Sweeney, supra note 16, at 298.

130. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 203.
133. Id. § 203(a)(1).
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university or exclusive licensee of a subject invention to license such
invention to any responsible applicant. 134 Thus, it appears evident that
a university must take legitimate and reasonable steps to utilize
government-funded research, or risk losing their patent monopoly.135
However, as discussed below, this is an empty threat, as the government
has never utilized this provision.136
4. The Bayh-Dole Act's Provisions: Patent Owner with
an Asterisk
Universities are not true patent owners because, inter alia, BayhDole prohibits universities from assigning patent rights. 137 This
provision was enacted to prevent universities from acquiring patents on
government-funded research and subsequently selling them to the
highest bidder to cover any outstanding budget shortfalls.' Further, it
prevents private companies from licensing technology in order to
suppress it.1 39 Interestingly, universities were initially prohibited from
providing exclusive licenses in durations greater than five years, 14 0 and
exclusive licenses could only be offered to small businesses. 14 1 Congress
soon recognized that this severely inhibited a university's ability to

134. Id.

§ 203(a).

To qualify and moderate these powers, Bayh-Dole requires that any license

granted pursuant to the march-in provision must be made "upon terms that are reasonable under the

circumstances." Id.
135. Id. §§ 202-203; HENDERSON & SMITH, supra note 15, at 5 (showing support that BayhDole provides an implied duty to commercialize on universities). For a discussion on the procedures
for an agency to utilize 35 U.S.C. § 293, see 37 C.F.R. § 401.6 (2016).
136. E.g., Allen, supra note 125; see also Ryan Whalen, Note, The Bayh-Dole Act & Public
Rights in FederallyFunded Inventions: Will the Agencies Ever Go Marching in?, 109 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1083, 1106-11 (2015) (discussing that the government has never utilized the march-in
provision and providing details of the various petitions). Joseph Allen, who served as a Professional
Staffer on the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee to former Senator Bayh at the time Bayh-Dole was
drafted and subsequently enacted recently stated:
That there haven't been more cases does not mean the system doesn't work. March in

rights are the fail safe mechanism of tech transfer. Just like airbags in your car, hopefully
they'll never be needed. March in rights haven't been necessary for a simple reason:
universities are effectively enforcing their deals. If a licensee is not meeting development

milestones, the license is revoked and another developer sought.
Allen, supranote 125.

137. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(A) (2012).
138. Joseph Allen, Does University PatentLicensingPay Off?, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/01/27/does-university-patent-licensing-pay-offlid=47655.
139. Allen, supra note 125.
140.

SCHACHT, supra note 16, at 7; see also S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 7 (1979). However, the

funding federal agency was able to approve extended exclusive licenses on a case-by-case basis. S.
REP. NO. 96-480, at 7 (quoting S. Res. 414, 96th Cong. (1979) (enacted)).
141. SCHACHT, supranote 16, at 7; S. REP. No. 96-480, at 7 (quoting S. Res. 414, 96th Cong.
(1979) (enacted)).
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license technology. 142 Thus, four years after enacting the Bayh-Dole Act,
Congress amended its relevant provisions removing these licensing
restrictions.1 43 Today, universities can offer both exclusive and nonexclusive licenses for any duration and field of use.144 However,
universities are required to license technology only to (1) small business
firms, 145 unless "infeasible following a reasonable inquiry," 46 and (2)
companies located in the United States, who will produce products in the
United States.1 4 7
Universities must also share a portion of all royalties derived from
subject inventions with the inventor.1 48 Notably, this provision does not
impose a sharing ratio or minimum share requirement between the
university and the inventor.1 49 The monetary incentive for the inventorscientist that (1) ensures the inventor-scientist discloses the invention to
the university, (2) encourages him or her to think of the possible
commercial applications for the technologies being developed, and (3)
most importantly, encourages participation in the commercialization
process.s0 Finally, Bayh-Dole "require[s] that the balance of any
royalties or income earned by the [university] with respect to subject
inventions, after payment of expenses (including payment to inventors)
incidental to the administration of subject inventions, . . . be utilized for

the support of scientific research or education.""' As discussed below,
in direct response to Bayh-Dole, nearly all universities performing
government-funded research established a TTO to oversee the
technology transfer process.' 52
142. SCHACHT, supra note 16, at 7 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-662, at 3 (1984)) ("[E]xtending the
time frame for licensing to large firms 'is particularly important with technologies such as
pharmaceuticals, where long development times and major investments are required prior to
commercialization."').

143. See S. REP. No. 98-662, at 3; SCHACHT, supranote 16, at 7.
144. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7) (2012).
145. The term "small business firm" is defined as "a small business concern as defined at
section 2 of Public Law 85-536 (15 U.S.C. 632) and implementing regulations of the Administrator
of the Small Business Administration." 35 U.S.C § 201(h).
146. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(D).
147. Id. § 200. Interestingly, an early draft of the Bayh-Dole Act included a "windfall"
provision, providing that if a university received a certain amount of revenue, the government was
entitled to recoup a certain percentage. S. REP. No. 96-480, at 30 (1979).
148. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B).
149. Id.; Platzer v. Sloan-Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 787 F. Supp. 360, 367-68
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[N]othing in the language [of Bayh-Dole] suggests that the share should be a
specified ratio. Nor does the definition of 'share' suggest that a particular ratio was intended.").
150. See discussion infra Part I.C.
151. § 202(c)(7)(C).
152. See Sampat, supra note 21, at 781; Valdivia, supra note 23, at 6, 7 fig.1 (depicting the
exponential growth of TTOs across the United States during the 1980s and early 1990s, and stating
that "[a]fter Bayh-Dole was enacted universities created the organizational capacities for managing
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The Technology Transfer Office

Agencies that fund basic research on university campuses do not
supply funds to commercialize that research; "[t]he government is
primarily funding basic research or research related to agency
missions-neither of which is geared to market needs."' In addition,
research scientists (the inventors), and often the universities themselves,
are unable or unwilling to provide the substantial investment-both in
time and in money-required to commercialize basic inventions. 5 4 As a
result, in order for Bayh-Dole to be successful, a desirable method
needed to be established for private industries to both access and license
government-funded research.'"' Today this occurs through licensing
arrangements between universities and private businesses. 15 6 However,
Bayh-Dole's provisions fail to provide any guidance as to the method
universities must follow in order to achieve this transfer of
technology. 5 ' Thus, it was up to the universities themselves to create
reliable methods for transferring technology from the laboratories to the
commercial sector.' These methods have evolved with the passage of
time,' 9 but regardless of the universities' technology transfer method,
and in direct response to Bayh-Dole, a TTO exists on nearly every
research campus.16 0

their intellectual property, opening and staffing technology transfer offices (TTOs) in a great
hurry").
153. Allen, supranote 138.
154. See Allen, supra note 125 ("Under [Bayh-Dole] the considerable risk and expense of
taking them from the lab into the market falls on the private sector.").
155. Katherine J. Strandburg et al., The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2143, 2164-65
(2009) ("[T]he U.S. government has made an explicit policy decision to allow funded entities to
obtain patents and thereby has encouraged participation in the commercialization of federally
funded research.").
156. 35 U.S.C. § 202; see also Strandburg et al., supra note 155, at 2156-57 ("[A]warding
patents to a university for government-funded research [provides the necessary incentive] to
facilitate postpatent research, development, and commercialization.").
157. HENDERSON & SMITH, supra note 15, at 5 ("[T]he [Bayh-Dole] Act does not provide
specific mechanisms to achieve commercialization and the public access it requires. This effectively
leaves the mechanisms of accomplishing this duty to the discretion of each grantee or contractor.");
Strandburg et al., supranote 155, at 2148 ("The Bayh-Dole Act enables universities to participate in
the commercialization process, but it does not obligate them to pursue any particular strategy with
respect to federally funded research.").
158. Strandburg et al., supra note 155, at 2164-65 ("As a general matter, universities are not
required by law to create technology transfer offices, delay or withhold publication of research
results, patent research results, issue exclusive licenses, or be entrepreneurs.... Universities remain
in the driver's seat and may decide which road to take and at what speed.").
159. Id. at 2165-66 (listing various methods universities may achieve Congress's goals set out
in Bayh-Dole).
160. See Sampat, supranote 21, at 781-82; Valdivia, supranote 23, at 6, 7 fig.1.
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The goal of TTOs around the country is to "[fjacilitate the
translation of academic research into practical applications, for the
benefit of society on a local, national and global basis." 16 1 In essence, the
TTO is the link between academia and industry. 162 This link often results
in the TTO taking an active role in the commercialization of new
technology. 163 For example, employees at a TTO may regularly visit
their respective university's laboratories. 16 4 Those visits are beneficial
for a multitude of reasons. First, they encourage the inventor-scientist to
consider commercial applications for their research at an early stage of
development. 165 Second, the scientists are reminded to provide invention
disclosure statements as required by Bayh-Dole. 16 6 Further, interactions
between the TTO and researchers enable the TTO to complete early
evaluations of the technology, learning directly from the inventor-the
person with the most knowledge about the new technology-potential
early commercial applications. 167
Under Bayh-Dole, a university may only recoup a limited amount
of the revenues generated from licensing agreements to cover some of
the costs related to technology transfer. 168 This includes the cost of
obtaining a patent, which for a highly complex patent can regularly
exceed $16,000.169 Due to such a large cost, one job of the TTO is to
identify technology with significant commercial applications, while
permitting other technology to enter into the public domain.17 0
Although Bayh-Dole "focused universities on 'commercially
relevant technologies and closer ties between research and technological
development,' the costs of patenting are such that 'most university

161.

Mission, supra note 63; see alsoAbout Research at Penn State, supranote 63 ("[T]ransfer

of University-developed technologies for commercialization, thereby providing benefits to
researchers, the University, and the citizens of the Commonwealth.").
162.

About Research at Penn State, supra note 63.

163. See, e.g., About, U. MICH., www.techtransfer.umich.edu/about (last visited Apr. 10, 2017)
("We work with researchers and faculty to provide advice about potential tech transfer issues during

research activities and to assist in the invention reporting process.").
164. E.g., Rosa Grimaldi et al., 30 Years After Bayh-Dole: Reassessing Academic
Entrepreneurship,40 RES. POL'Y, 1045, 1048 (2011).
165. Id.
166. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1) (2012); see also Grimaldi, supranote 164, at 1048.
167. Grimaldi, supranote 164, at 1048.
168. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7).
169. Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4,
2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485.
Notably, universities are entitled to the "small entity" rate, which reduces their filing fee. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(3) (2017).
170. See Kyle, supra note 1 (noting that Katy Ritter, director of the technology transfer office
at Boise State University stated that "[she] would love to patent more, but we have to be judicious
about what IP we choose to protect because of budget constraints").
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licensing offices barely break even."'l71 One empirical study has stated
that "it takes between five and ten years for a TTO to break even, if it
does at all."l 72 A second study indicates that few TTOs raised significant
income from licensing their patents under Bayh-Dole.1 73 Nearly all of
the profitable TTOs are the direct result of revenue related to one
"blockbuster" or "home run" patent. 174 For example, since 2008,
Northwestern University has led all universities in revenues from subject
inventions-to the tune of nearly $1.36 billion as a direct result of
licensing the anti-seizure drug Lyrica to Pfizer.'77 In reality, nearly
eighty-five percent of TTOs are not self-sustaining. 176
Notwithstanding that many TTOs are a cost to their respective
university, 1 77 there are other significant intangible benefits that TTOs
generate to both the university and the general public including, inter
alia, "supporting 4 million good paying jobs" throughout the United
States, and generating significant revenue for the local economy. 178 It is
unclear what factors indicate a successful TTO. 179 TTOs often cite
171. SCHACHT, supra note 16, at 12 (quoting Shane, supra note 16, at 128); see also
Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 359-60 ("More often than not, technology transfer offices drain

university resources, promising the sky but delivering little.").
172. Jay P. Kesan, TransferringInnovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2169, 2180 (2009) (quoting
Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and ProprietaryRights: Putting Patents in Their Proper

Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 234 (2006)).
173. See Valdivia, supra note 23, at 6, 7 fig.2 (depicting the distribution of licensing gross
income by university). One empirical study found that:
In 2012, a year very much in line with the ten-year trends in this sector, the top 5% of
earners (8 universities) took 50% of the total licensing income of the university system;
and the top 10% (16 universities) took nearly three-quarters of the system's income. Not
only licensing revenue is highly asymmetric but also the highest earners have become a

select club with a stable membership. Only 37 universities have been able to reach the
top 20 of licensing revenue any given year over the last decade.

Id. at 6.
174. SCHACHT, supra note 16, at 19 ("The financial rewards derived from patenting often are a
small portion of the total amount of R&D funding for academic institutions and what substantial
money does flow into individual institutions tends to be the result of one 'blockbuster' patent."); see
also Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 360-61 (discussing the "home run" mentality of technology
transfer offices).
175. See Andrew L. Wang, Northwestern University Leads Nation in Tech Transfer

Revenue, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS. (Oct. 27, 2012), www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20121027/
(stating that
ISSUE01/310279974/northwestern-university-leads-nation-in-tech-transfer-revenue
Northwestern University's TTOs revenues are "mask[ing] a lackluster record of entrepreneurship at
Illinois Institutions of higher education"). According to the AUTM, Northwestern received twentyfour percent of the $3.4 billion total received by all TTOs. Kyle, supra note 1.
176.

Irene Abrams et al., How Are US. Technology Transfer Offices Tasked and Motivated-Is

It All About the Money?, RES. MGMT REv., Fall/Winter 2009, at 18, 31 tbl.11 (2009) (providing a
detailed statistical analysis of TTOs in the United States).
177.

See supra text accompanying notes 171-76.

178. Allen, supranote 125.
179. See Vertinsky, supra note 20, at 2004-07 (discussing that statistics might not hold TTOs
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positive statistics such as "companies started" or "patents obtained" in
order to increase their funding from the university.'s These statistics are
often misleading; about seventy-five percent of all startups fail, and very
often, patents either remain unlicensed or the licensing agreement fails
and the patent rights revert back to the university.18 1
TTOs often have very limited resources (and time) to review
inventions and determine if obtaining a patent is worth pursuing or to
permit the research to enter the public domain.' 82 Consequently, TTOs
are unable to patent every invention that has commercial viability."'
Thus, they only pursue patent protection on technology that has been
determined to have significant and plausible commercial implicationsand enormous commercial potential.1 84 Interestingly, despite only
patenting technology with realistic commercial implications, many either
remain unlicensed by the TTO (or the initial licensing deal fails), so the
rights return to the TTO, and the patent is not relicensed to the public.'
III. CURRENTLY, THERE ARE No REPERCUSSIONS IF TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER OFFICES FAIL TO LICENSE STALLED PATENTS, AND No
INCENTIVE FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICES TO REVIEW THEIR
PORTFOLIO OF STALLED PATENTS

In general, there are no accurate means to measure the success, or
lack thereof, of the Bayh-Dole Act."' However, in 2002, The Economist

accountable).
180. See, e.g., Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 64, at 5 (boasting that as a result
of the Bayh-Dole Act, universities have spun off nearly 5000 companies, been issued over 80,000
patents, and from 1996-2013, had an economic impact of nearly 1.1 trillion dollars on the U.S.
gross industrial output); PENN STATE, ANNUAL REPORT OF RESEARCH ACTIVITY (2016), https://
www.research.psu.edu/sites/default/files/2016_OVPRAnnual_Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 10,
2017) (stating that technology transfer at Pennsylvania State University has resulted in thirty-six
patents issued and eight startup companies formed).
181. See Allen, supra note 138.
182. See SCHACHT, supra note 16, at 19; Abrams et al., supranote 176, at 44.
183. See Loise & Stevens, supra note 1, at 192 ("[F]unding the technology transfer function
itself is a major issue at most universities . . . ."); Samantha R. Bradley et al., Models and Methods
of University Technology Transfer 10-11 (Dep't of Econ., Univ. of N.C. Greensboro, Working
Paper No. 13-10, 2013), http://bryan.uncg.edu/assets/research/econwp/2013/13-10.pdf ("TTO must
be selective about which inventions to pursue.").
184. See Loise & Stevens, supra note 1, at 192; Bradley et al., supra note 183, at 10-11. An
empirical study detailing the priorities that TTO managers place on the outcome of TTO activities
found that most universities favor licensing revenues when measuring the success of its TT0.
Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypesfor Sale: The Licensing of University
Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 243-45 (2001). However, according to that same survey, the
goal of commercializing inventions is just slightly less than that of licensing revenues. Id. at 245.
185. See infra PartIII.
186. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
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labeled Bayh-Dole as "[p]ossibly the most inspired piece of legislation
to be enacted in America over the past half-century."1 87 The passing of
Bayh-Dole sparked the formation of new companies, helped introduce
new products into the market, and as a result, new jobs across the
nation.' 8 Nearly all agree that Bayh-Dole, as currently written, provides
a great foundation which we can continue to build on' 89 : "It is readily
apparent that the Act's underlying philosophy is sound. The point,
rather, is to recognize where it has strayed from [its] philosophy ....
Bayh-Dole has been very effective in facilitating the introduction of
new products in technology sectors such as pharmaceuticals and
nanotechnology.1'9 However, even within those industries, very often
only inventions with the clearest and simplest path to commercialization
are successfully being licensed to industry.' 9 2 In fact, "most university
inventions are never picked up by a licensee."1 93 Thus, many inventions
that a TTO has elected to patent-meaning at one time a TTO felt the
invention had significant commercial value-sit idly in the TTO's patent
portfolio awaiting utilization.' 94
Further, as discussed above, all current proposals to enhance BayhDole focus primarily on the commercialization of developing
technology-meaning the technology being developed in labs today.1 95
This problem is compounded because due to budget constraints, TTOs

187.

Innovation's Golden Goose, ECONOMIST (Dec. 12, 2002), www.economist.com/node/

1476653 ("Together with amendments in 1984 and augmentation in 1986, this unlocked all the
inventions and discoveries that had been made in laboratories throughout the United States with the

help of taxpayers' money. More than anything, this single policy measure helped to reverse
America's precipitous slide into industrial irrelevance.").
188. See H.R. Con. Res. 328, 111th Cong. (2010) ("Whereas economic activity spurred on by
the Bayh-Dole Act include the formation of more than 6,500 new companies from the inventions
created under the act, an estimated contribution of $450,000,000,000 to the United States gross
industrial output, and the creation of 20,000 new high technology jobs between 1999 and
2007 ... ); see also ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 64, at 5 ("From 1996 to 2013,
the economic impact ofuniversity and nonprofit patent licensing was $518 billion on the U.S. gross

domestic product [and] $1.1 trillion on the U.S. industrial output.").
189.

See H.R. Con. Res. 328; Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supranote 64, at 5.

190.

Sweeney, supra note 16, at 297.

191.

See supra notes 16, 187-89 and accompanying text.

192. See Mats A. Lundqvist & Karen L. Williams, Adding Licensing and Venture Creationto a
University Mission of Open Exchange 16 (Chalmers Publ'n Library, Working Paper A307, 2005),
http://publications.lib.chalmers.se/records/fulltext/12551/local 12551.pdf.
193. de Larena, supra note 15, at 1381-82.
194. See supra Part II.C; see, e.g., Kyle, supra note 1 ("After spending thousands on initial
filings, Boise State has chosen not to pursue patents on the drugs, though it has filed for patents for
two other Hampikian inventions: a miniature pump for use in forensic DNA analysis and a
transducer that can generate energy. So Hampikian plans to pay himself to file patents for the cancer
drugs, though he will likely need investors to advance them.").
195. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
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are often forced to focus their efforts on new technology, not their
existing patent portfolios.196 In addition, TTOs are trying to
commercialize basic research, which is inherently difficult. 19 7 Currently,
Bayh-Dole does not impose penalties for TTOs who obtain large
portfolios of Stalled Patents, nor does it provide a specific incentive for
TTOs to actively review their portfolios of Stalled Patents.' 98
Stalled Patents are in direct contrast to the Bayh-Dole Act's
underlying policies; it is impossible for new products to be introduced to
society when the only entity that is legally permitted to develop that
technology fails to do so.1 9 9 Moreover, when licensing agreements failmeaning that the licensee is no longer in business or fails to
commercialize the invention-the license typically reverts back to the
TTO.200 In such situations, TTOs typically do not seek a second
licensee.20 ' Thus, in many cases, instead of inventions collecting dust on
the shelves of agencies, today, inventions-many of which are Stalled
Patents-are collecting dust on the shelves of TTOs.202
Notably, "[w]hen universities and other private contractors
underutilize or improperly apply their Bayh-Dole responsibilities,
taxpayers are often left footing the bill or are deprived of a potentially
vital new technology (or both)."20 3 This Part discusses that, due to
nobody's fault in particular, it is inevitable that commercially viable
inventions arising from federally funded research become Stalled
Patents.204 Specifically, Subpart A discusses why TTOs are obtaining
large patent portfolios with no fear of the government marching in.2 05
Next, Subpart B addresses, in part, why the funding (or lack thereof) and
the structure of TTOs lead to Stalled Patents.2 06 In fact, TTOs (1) have
no incentive to actively commercialize Stalled Patents and (2) do not
have the resources to actively commercialize them. 207 Further, due to
their structure within the university, limited budgets, and the constant
196. See infra Part III.B.l.
197. See supra notes 56, 101 and accompanying text.
198. See infra Part III.A.
199.

See supra Part II.B.

200. Shinae Kim-Helms, Review of Key Clauses in University/Biotechnology Industry
Licensing Agreements, LES NOUVELLES, Mar. 2007, at 371, 380 ("After the agreement is
terminated, the rights granted to the licensee revert back to the licensor and any further use of the
licensed technology by the licensee would constitute infringement.").
201. See infra Part III.B.1.
202. See infra Part IIA-B.
203.

See Sweeney, supranote 16, at 299.

204.
205.
206.
207.

See
See
See
See

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

III.A-B.
III.A.
III.B.
III. A-B.
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development of new technology on campuses, TTOs are typically only
focused on commercializing new technology. 208
A.

Technology Transfer Offices Are ObtainingLarge Patent Portfolios
with No Fear of the Government MarchingIn

The march-in provision was included in the Bayh-Dole Act to
protect the taxpayer by ensuring that new technology is introduced to
society and to provide "a sufficient safeguard to protect public welfare
requirements and prevent any undesirable economic concentration." 20 9
Some scholars argue that the ultimate result of 35 U.S.C. §§ 202 and
203 is that universities now have an implied duty to commercialize
government-funded research. 2 0 But this is an empty implication. 2 11
Since the enactment of Bayh-Dole, only six march-in petitions were
filed, none of which have been successful.2 12 In fact, "[i]n more than 35
years only one case has met the criteria of the march-in provision. "213
That case was also rejected.2 14
Notably, nearly all march-in petitions were based on the fact that
the price of a specific drug was too high.2 15 It appears that there is no
chance of a march-in petition being filed because a university failed to
license a specific patent or licensed it to a company that fails to
commercialize it. 2 16 And if a march-in petition were to be filed against
a university, there is little, if any, chance of the petition being
successful. 217 Regardless, a successful march-in petition would not
nullify the patent; the petitioning entity receives a license to practice the
previously licensed invention without fear that the original licensee can
file a lawsuit against them.218
Consequently, whether the university fails to license a particular
patent or licenses the patent to a company with a very low success rate,
208.
209.

See infra Part 1IIB.
35 U.S.C. § 203 (2012); S. REP. No. 96-480, at 28 (1979).

210. E.g., HENDERSON & SMITH, supra note 15, at 4-5 (stating that the ultimate result of Bayh-

Dole is an implied duty for universities to commercialize government-funded technology).
211. See Therien v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., No. 04-4786, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 746, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 10, 2006) (holding that Bayh-Dole may not impose on universities any duties to
commercialize subject inventions); see also JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SER., R44597,
MARCH-IN RIGHTS UNDER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 7-12 (2016).

212. See THOMAS, supra note 211, at 8-10 (detailing the six march-in petitions that have been
filed in the past thirty-five years).
213. See Allen, supra note 125.
214. Id.
215.

See THOMAS, supra note 211, at 9.

216. Id. at 8-10.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 7-8.
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there is no risk that the university will be susceptible to the federal
government's march-in provision.219 In fact, because of this, some
universities are deliberately not licensing patents. 2 20 As a result, under
current practices, universities are obtaining enormous patent portfolios at
ever-growing costs, without any fear of the government marching in. 22 1
As discussed in the next Subpart, due to budget constraints and passive
licensing polices, TTOs' ever-growing patent portfolios inevitably result
in Stalled Patents.
B. Limited FinancialIncentives and Limited Technology Transfer
Resources Result in More Stalled Patents-AndNearly No Chance of
Fulfilling the Bayh-Dole Act's Mandate of CommercialInnovation
Bayh-Dole's provisions provide no guidance-and no funds-as to
the method universities must follow in order to achieve the transfer of
technology. 222 Moreover, due to the government's unwillingness to
utilize the march-in provision, universities are free to choose any
licensing scheme they wish. 223 For various reasons, "[u]niversities are
generally quite passive about licensing their technology." 2 24 Subpart 1
illustrates why TTOs focus their limited resources on new technology.225
Subpart 2 explains why, due to the "blockbuster effect," some TTOs
"over patent. "226 This leads to both an increase in Stalled Patents and an
environment that discourages TTOs from seeking new licensees to
commercialize Stalled Patents.227

219. Id; Therien v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., No. 04-4786, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 746, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2006); see also Whalen, supra note 136, at 1099-1106 (describing the reasons
why each march-in petition was declined).
220. See de Larena, supra note 15, at 1417-19 (describing "questionable" licensing procedures
of TTOs); Bayhing for Blood or Doling out Cash?, ECONOMIST (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.
economist.com/node/5327661 (providing an example where the licensee of a Bayh-Dole patent
aggressively sued companies infringing on its patent to test for breast cancer). An analysis of this
tactic is outside the scope of this Note. For a review of whether the patent system is creating an
environment of universities acting as patent trolls, see id
221. See infra Part HI; see also Available Technologies, COLUM.: TECH. VENTURES,

http://innovation.columbia.edu/technologies (last visited Apr. 10, 2017) (listing over 1300
technologies available to license from Columbia University); Technologies Availablefor Licensing,
PENN ST., https://www.research.psu.edu/otm/license-technologies (last visited Apr. 10, 2017)
(providing a list of several hundred different technologies available for licensing from Pennsylvania
State University).
222.

See supra Part H.C.

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See supra Part HA.
de Larena, supra note 15, at 1413.
See infra Part ILI.B.l.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part HI.B.2.
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1. Due to Limited Budgets, Technology Transfer Offices
Primarily Focus Resources on the Commercialization of New
Technology, Which Directly Results in Stalled Patents
Collecting Dust on University Shelves
The drafters of the Bayh-Dole Act believed-and at least one
empirical study has proved-that providing universities with economic
incentives increases the likelihood that technology is successfully
transferred from the laboratory to society.22 8 However, due to the
provisions of Bayh-Dole and the actual funding agreement between
the government and the university, financial resources for
commercialization are limited.229 In addition, "universities collect only
one third of the licensing revenues raised by the TTO but shoulder all of
the operating costs."230 Traditionally, federal research grants prohibit
universities from utilizing the funds for commercializing the research
that the grants help develop.231 When there are residual revenues
retained by the university, Bayh-Dole only permits the funds to be spent
on additional research and education, not commercialization.232
Today, most TTOs operate at a loss and may be a drain on valuable
university resources. 23 Studies have shown that, on a yearly average,
228. McManis & Yagi, supra note 20, at 1057-59 (finding empirical support for the conclusion
that Bayh-Dole played an important role in technology transfer in the United States compared to
other nations). One author compared the Unites States' and Sweden's technology transfer industries:
Moreover, in a comparison of U.S. and Swedish Innovation Systems that affect the
commercialization of university technology generally, the authors of a 2002 study noted
that "[tihe US model is very much focused on creating (economic) incentives for
universities to commercialize their research output," whereas "the Swedish model, which
is similar to most European Union countries' models in some respects, is very much
an attempt by the government to directly create mechanisms that facilitate
commercialization" .
In light of [this] analysis ... it is unlikely that Sweden is
harvesting the full commercial potential of its research output as successfully as the US."
Id. (quoting Brent Goldfarb & Magnus Henreckson, Bottom- Up Versus Top-Down Policies Towards
the Commercializationof University Intellectual Property, 32 RES. POL'Y 639, 640 (2003)). But see
Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Unveiling the Distinction Between the University and Its Academic
Researchers:Lessons for Patent Infringement and University Technology Transfer, 12 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 510-11 (2010) (highlighting that profit motivations, particularly for inventorscientists, is less existent in academia); Shane, supra note 96 ("Successful commercialization of
university inventions depends on more than just incentives.").
229. See 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2012); Valdivia, supra note 23, at 6, 7 fig.2, 9; Kesan, supra note
172, at 2179-80.
230. Valdivia, supra note 23, at 9.
231.

ASs'N OF AM. UNIVS. ET AL., REGULATORY AND FINANCIAL REFORM OF FEDERAL

RESEARCH POLICY: RECOMMENDATION TO THE NRC COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 1-2
(2011), www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=11662 (discussing the growing fiscal
challenges of operating in the field of technology transfer).
232. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(C). But see Sweeney, supra note 16, at 310 (stating that it is
impossible for the government to monitor the use of this revenue).
233. E.g., Valdivia, supra note 23, at 9; see de Larena, supra note 15, at 1431-33. Notably,
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about eighty-four percent of TTOs lose money.234 As demonstrated in
the next Subpart, nearly all of the profitable TTOs are based on profits
from one or two blockbuster patents.235 Thus, under current policies,
there is little incentive for universities to actively pursue licenses if
initial efforts fail.236 Alternately stated, if a patent is not immediately
licensed with the hope of becoming a "blockbuster," there is
little economic incentive for the TTO to actively seek a license
agreement 23 7-particularly when the average licensing agreement results
in $13,126 of revenue.23 8
This is particularly troubling because, as noted in Part IV, the
market for a specific technology may have since grown, and there now
are new, lucrative applications available.239 If the TTO were to actively
pursue licenses for Stalled Patents, there is a distinct possibility that a
licensee could be found.24 0 This would result in new technology being
241
introduced into society, fulfilling the Bayh-Dole Act's mandate.
Currently, that is not occurring; TTOs adopt a passive approach to
licensing Stalled Patents, and there is little hope for Stalled Patents to
become the basis for commercial products.242 In fact, one common
method of licensing Stalled Patents is "simply to list available
technologies on a website, hoping that potential licensees will come
upon them in Internet searches." 24 3
The longer a patent remains unlicensed, the less likely that a
TTO locates a licensee.24 4 This problem is compounded because new
inventions are always being developed on university campuses, directing
24 5
the efforts of TTO's away from Stalled Patents. Thus, there is little or
no chance that the public will benefit from the use of commercial
products based on Stalled Patents.

"over half of all technology-transfer income goes to just ten schools." de Larena, supra note 15, at
1431.
234. Abrams, supra note 176, at 30-31 (finding that only sixteen percent of TTOs are selfsustaining); Valdivia, supra note 23, at 9.
235. See infra Part I1I.B.2.
236.

See Kyle, supra note 1.

237. See de Larena, supra note 15, at 1381-82.
238. See Kyle, supra note 1.
239. See infra Part IV.B.
240. See McManis & Yagi, supra note 20, at 1057-59.
241. See supra Part I.
242. de Larena, supra note 15, at 1413-14.
243. Id.; see, e.g., Available Technologies, supra note 221.
244. See supranotes 233-38 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., E-mail from Stanford Univ., Office. of Tech. Licensing, to author (Jan. 11,
2017, 8:00 AM) (on file with author) (listing only the new technologies that are available for
potential licensees at Stanford University).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss3/10

30

Stern: Stalled Patents: Re-Incentivizing Universities to Review Their Po

20171

STALLED PATENTS: RE-INCENTIVIZING UNIVERSITIES

1047

2. The Blockbuster Effect and Passive Licensing Practices Lead
to an Increase in Stalled Patents
Accounts "of blockbuster patents have fueled the ambition of TTO
heads and university administrators alike."2 46 It is easy to see how some
TTOs, blinded by Stanford's windfall profits from Google or
Northwestern University's profits from Lyrica, patent any invention that
has the potential to produce a similar payout.24 7 Scholars have referred to
this as the "blockbuster effect" or the "lottery effect" whereby TTOs file
large numbers of patent applications because of their belief that there is a
chance that one might result in enormous returns. 2 48 Famed former Dean
of the Harvard Law School, Professor Derek Bok explains:
Most universities have not earned much money from royalties; the
odds of making anything substantial from patenting a new discovery
are extremely small. Still, the extraordinary success of a few patents
and the many millions of dollars in royalties earned each year by a
small minority of schools are enough to keep scores of institutions
scouring labs for commercially valuable innovations. 249
In addition, by focusing on short-term "lottery" patents, many
TTOs do not focus on the long-term investment potential of these
inventions.250 This is known as the "home run" mentality: "TTO officers
focus their limited time and resources on technologies that appear to
promise the biggest, fastest payback. Technologies that might have
longer-term potential .. . tend to pile up in the queue, get short shrift, or
get overlooked entirely." 25 1 Thus, when a licensing agreement is not
immediately reached, it becomes very unlikely that the TTO will
successfully license the patent.252 In fact, one study found that a majority
of university inventions are never licensed.253 Considering that the "first
use of an invention is usually not the most important one," viable

246. Valdivia, supra note 23, at 11.
247. See id. at 11-12; de Larena, supra note 15, at 1381-82; Kesan, supra note 172, at 2180-81;
see also Sweeney, supra note 16, at 309 ("Therefore, the vast majority of patents are applied for in
the hopes that they will 'win' big.").
248. See Sweeney, supra note 16, at 309.
249. BOK, supra note 20, at 77. Empirical data suggests that universities with the smallest
research and development budgets have a probability of less than five percent of landing a
blockbuster patent in a given year. Valdivia, supra note 23, at 11-12, 11 tbl.2.
250. See Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University Innovations: A Better Way 7,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2007/5/innovations-litan/05innovations
litan.pdf.
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. de Larena, supra note 15, at 1381 n.50 (citing Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra
note 27, at 15,21-24).
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and valuable commercial products are collecting dust on the shelves
of TTOs.254
Scholars have expressed concern that TTOs are obtaining too many
patents. 255 For example, Columbia University lists 1340 technologies
that are available to be licensed.256 One of Columbia University's public
approaches to technology transfer is to list all available patents that can
be licensed on their website, in the hope that private industry will
contact their office to "start the licensing process."257
The goal of Bayh-Dole is to provide a financial incentive
to universities to increase the chance of a technology being
commercialized. 25 8 A TTO that actively pursues licensees increases the
overall likelihood of success that technology will be transferred from the
laboratory to society. 259 A passive approach to licensing is in direct
opposition to that goal; it creates even more Stalled Patents and limits
260
the likelihood that Stalled Patents will be commercialized. Thus, a
passive approach to licensing by TTOs leads to the current scenario
where a large percentage of the taxpayers' investment-and an
additional investment by the TTO to patent the technology-are
"wasted."2 61 Provided TTOs can be incentivized to review their portfolio
of Stalled Patents and actively seek out licensees, it is possible-even
likely-that new products will be introduced into society, further
satisfying the Bayh-Dole Act's noble mandate.2 62 It is entirely possible
that the next society altering technology is collecting dust on the shelf of
a TTO; and with up to fifteen years remaining on its patent term, there
is a large financial upside for private industry to invest their time
and money.
254. Government PatentPolicy, supranote 9, at 519 (statement of Monte C. Throdahl, Senior
Vice President, Monsanto Co.).
255.

See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an

&

Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 457, 464-65 (2004); Michael A. Heller

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,

280 SC. 698, 698-700 (1998) ("By conferring monopolies in discoveries, patents necessarily
increase prices and restrict use-a cost society pays to motivate invention and disclosure. The
tragedy of the anticommons refers to the more complex obstacles that arise when a user needs
access to multiple patented inputs to create a single useful product."); Kesan, supra note 172, at
2189-93 (discussing various theories that universities over-patenting actually impedes innovation).
256. Available Technologies, supra note 221.
257.

Start the Licensing Process, COLUM., http://techventures.columbia.edu/main-section/

industry/start-licensing-process (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (providing contact information for
licensing).
258. See supraPart I.
259.

See supraPart III.

260. See supraPart III.
261. See supranotes 26-30 and accompanying text.
262. See infra PartIV.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss3/10

32

Stern: Stalled Patents: Re-Incentivizing Universities to Review Their Po

2017]

STALLED PATENTS: RE-INCENTIVIZING UNIVERSITIES

1049

IV. BY RE-INCENTIVIZING UNIVERSITIES TO ACTIVELY LICENSE
STALLED PATENTS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICES WILL SCOUR
THEIR EXISTING PATENT PORTFOLIOS, INCREASING THE CHANCE OF
UTILIZATION OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED TECHNOLOGY

As a direct result of the Bayh-Dole Act's economic incentive,
TTOs began to search their laboratories for government-funded
inventions with potential commercial applications.2 63 Some of these
inventions-particularly the "low hanging fruit"-were successfully
commercialized; products such as Google and Lyrica have changed
society for the better and resulted in millions of dollars of royalties to
university coffers.264 However, many fully-funded government
inventions-inventions that at one time a university believed had
significant commercial applications-remain unlicensed, collecting dust
on the shelves of TTOs.265 Stalled Patents result in a "double" net loss;
both taxpayers and universities have invested significant funds to
develop and patent the technology.2 66 In today's economic climate,
government agency and university budgets are already stretched thin.267
Commercializing Stalled Patents will improve both the universities
and the taxpayers' economic standing. Although nearly all agree that
an increase in funding for the sole purpose of commercialization
will increase the success rate of technology transfer-which is
occurring more consistently than ever before 268-altemative solutions
are available.269
When TTOs elect to patent government-funded research, studies
show that most patents are never licensed to the private sector for
commercialization.2 70 As discussed in Part I, the proposed amendment
only applies to Stalled Patents.271 Amending Bayh-Dole to provide new
incentives for TTOs to license Stalled Patents will result in an increase
in the likelihood that Stalled Patents are licensed to private industry and,
potentially, commercialized.272 Currently, that chance is zero.273 This
Note identifies an issue with current technology transfer policies

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See supranote 96 and accompanying text.
See supraPart III.
See supraPart III.
See supraPart III.
See supraPart HIB.1.
See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., de Larena, supra note 15, at 1381-82.
See supra Part I.
See McManis & Yagi, supra note 20, at 1057.
See infra Part IV.
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and budgeting;2 74 the goal is to encourage policymakers to consider
proposals to commercialize Stalled Patents. In the current environment,
furthering that discussion is better than the status quo.
The proposed amendment will re-incentivize universities to actively
seek licenses for Stalled Patents.2 75 The amendment provides the
necessary economic resources and incentives so TTOs mount a second
legitimate effort to help the public gain a greater return on their billions
of dollars of investments.276 Further, the proposal provides something
that Bayh-Dole, in its current form, will never provide-a potential and
actual consequence to the TTO if licensing efforts are ineffective.27 7
A five-year term should be selected because the review would
occur before the second maintenance fee is due, a cost that may result in
TTOs permitting a patent to become abandoned (and enter the public
outcome that studies show will result in the
domain) 2 78-an
underutilization of the technology.2 79 In addition, Stalled Patents will
have up to fifteen years of their patent term remaining, ample time for an
exclusive licensee to see enormous profits from their investments in the
commercialization of Stalled Patents.280 This is important because as
addressed previously, the cost of commercializing basic research is
often ten times the price of developing it.281 Further, after five years,
the commercial potential for Stalled Patents is both greater and easier
to predict.282
The effect of this proposal will be very similar to the enactment of
Bayh-Dole; however, instead of scouring their laboratories to locate
commercially desirable inventions,283 universities will reexamine their
existing patent portfolios comprised of Stalled Patents. Such Stalled
Patents (1) were based on research previously funded entirely by
taxpayers, (2) were considered to be of significant commercial value at
one time by the university, and (3) were afforded patent protection after
the university expended its limited resources for this right. 284 By
274.

See supra Part III.

275.
276.
277.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.

278.

See Maintain Your Patent, U.S.

PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,

https://www.uspto.

gov/patents-maintaining-patent/maintain-your-patent (last visited Apr. 10, 2017) (stating that
maintenance fees are due three times during the life of a patent and may be paid "without surcharge
at 3 to 3.5 years, 7 to 7.5 years, and 11 to 11.5 years after the date of issue").
279. See id.
280. See supra Part Ill.B.
281. See supra Part II.C.
282. See infra Part IV.A.
283. See supranotes 19, 88, 98, 229, 242 and accompanying text.
284. See supranotes 98, 177-80, 189-96 and accompanying text.
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supplying new resources and an additional economic upside specifically
for TTOs to review their portfolio of Stalled Patents, TTOs will be
exploiting new opportunities that were not available five years prior.
TTOs will now reexamine their portfolios of Stalled Patents on an
annual basis and perhaps find new commercial applications for the
technology-applications that were not possible at the time of the
invention.285 In fact, the first use of a patent is most likely not the most
advantageous one, thus, making it likely that some Stalled Patents will
have significant commercial applications.2 86
Subpart A explains why after five years the commercial potential
for many inventions actually increases. 287 Next, this Note discusses that
allowing universities to keep a greater percentage of revenues, and
permitting those revenues to cover budget shortfalls, creates an
environment that requires TTOs to take an increasingly active approach
to licensing, or risk legitimate consequences-an outcome that is not
possible under the current system.288 Additionally, it suggests that
university TTOs are uniquely positioned on the university campus and
may have access to resources that they are currently underutilizing.
A.

The Five-Year Maturing PeriodMay Allow Society to Build
the Necessary InfrastructureandAllow Society Time to
Adopt the Technology

Universities, unlike private companies, conduct basic research.28 9
The commercial applications for basic research are often unclear,
particularly when comparable technology has not been introduced into
society.2 90 During the proposed five-year gap, it is possible that
technological advances result in that basic research "maturing," thereby
reducing the barriers to innovation.2 9 ' As many authors have discussed,
successfully bringing technology from the laboratory to the real world

285.
286.

See infra Part IV.A.
See Government Patent Policy, supra note 9, at 519 (statement of Monte C. Throdahl,

Senior Vice President, Monsanto Co.).
287. See infra Part IV.A.
288. See infra Part IV.B.
289. See supranote 56 and accompanying text.
290. E.g., Clive Thompson, On Demand: When Uber Wanted a Team of Robotics, It Raided a
University Lab to Get Them, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2015 (Magazine), at 40 (discussing that as
technology fields mature, universities are able to profit on their basic research).
291. Id. ("At Level 1, an area of scientific inquiry is so new that nobody understands its basic
principles. At Level 9, the related technology is so mature its ready to be used in commercial
products.").
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often requires both proper infrastructure and societal acceptance.29 2
Below is a simple example of the infrastructure argument:
To introduce tractor technology to farming in an undeveloped area
means more than just landing a tractor in a field-there has to be a
supply of fuel, and spare parts, and training for those using the tractor
or servicing it, and the fields have to be dry enough to use the tractor,
and there has to be something for the tractor to pull, like a plow, and a
place for the tractor to be parked so it is out of the weather, and won't
get stolen. 293

In addition, society must be ready to accept and adopt the
innovation.2 94 For example, The New Yorker discussed the social
rejection of Google's much-maligned but technologically innovative
product Google Glass. 2 95 Thus, when a TTO reviews its portfolio of
Stalled Patents, the five-year time lapse may have permitted society-in
both infrastructure and social norms-to catch up.2 96 Moreover, the
improved infrastructure may result in potential applications for the
underlying technology that were not in existence during initial licensing
efforts.297 It is possible, even inevitable, that some Stalled Patents have
zero commercial potential, but considering that it took over fifty years
for touch-screen technology to go from the laboratory to the iPhone,

292. See, e.g., Philip Auerswald, Funding j Innovation, LINKEDIN PULSE (May 27, 2015),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/funding-innovation-philip-auerswald.
293.

Gerald Barnett, Sparrows, Mocking Birds, and Crows, RES. ENTERPRISE (Nov. 13, 2013),

http://researchenterprise.org/2013/11/23/sparrows-mockingbirds-and-crows; see also Auerswald,
supra note 292 (stating that "[t]he apparatus for bringing the fruits of science to market" must exist
in society or innovation is impossible).
294. See, e.g., Katrien Luijkx et al., "Grandma, You Should Do It-It's Cool" Older Adults and
the Role of Family Members in Their Acceptance of Technology, 12 INT'L J. ENv'T RES. & PUB.

HEALTH 15470, 15473-80 (2015) (finding that gender and age are significant factors when society is
trying to adopt new technology); Viswanath Venkatesh & Michael G. Morris, Why Don 't Men Ever
Stop to Ask for Directions? Gender, Social Influence, and Their Role in Technology Acceptance and

Usage Behavior, 24 MIS Q. 115, 128-31 (2000) (finding that society must be ready to accept the
technology, both in the short and long term).
295. Anisse Gross, What's the Problem with Google Glass?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/whats-the-problem-with-google-glass
(finding that
the technology made people "uncomfortable"). One Google Glass user stated: "I'm not wearing my
$1,500 face computer on public transit where there's a good chance it might be yanked from my
face." Id. He went on to say:
I won't wear it out to dinner, because it seems as rude as holding a phone in my hand
during a meal. I won't wear it to a bar. I won't wear it to a movie .... Again and again, I

made people very uncomfortable. That made me very uncomfortable. People get angry at
[Google] Glass. They get angry at you for wearing [Google] Glass.
Id.
296. See Auerswald, supra note 292.
297. See Venkatesh & Morris, supranote 294, at 128-31; Barnett, supra note 293.
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sometimes it just takes time for other technologies to catch up.298 In
essence, the benefit to society (and the university) if even just one
Stalled Patent became a "blockbuster" would be enormous. Perhaps the
next cancer-fighting drug is collecting dust on the shelf of a university
right now, waiting to be licensed to private industry.
Some scholars argue-just as opponents to the enactment of the
Bayh-Dole Act did-that Stalled Patents should be placed in the public
domain in order to permit academic research to occur free from a
potential patent infringement suit.29 9 However, for many Stalled Patents,
the initial commercial possibilities are often unclear and may require a
substantial monetary investment in order to be commercialized.3 00
Thus, particularly for the commercially desirable Stalled Patents, the
prospective licensee must be willing to invest the necessary capital in
order to commercialize the underlying technology; otherwise, there will
continue to be underutilization of Stalled Patents. 0 1 For some, the
potential upside of a blockbuster patent, even with a shorter patent
term,302 will be sufficient to encourage this.303 Without exclusivity, no
company would make the time and cost intensive investment to
commercialize Stalled Patents.304
Allowing technology to mature five years will permit TTOs and
private industries to more accurately predict which unlicensed
technologies are worth an additional investment. 0 s This will also permit
TTOs to utilize their limited resources more effectively.3 0 6 In other
words, the technological and societal changes over five years will enable
TTOs to predict which Stalled Patents have commercial upside and to
focus their limited resources on finding a licensee for those specific

298. See Mary Bellis, Who Invented Touch Screen Technology, THOUGHTCO. (Aug. 6, 2016),
https://www.thoughtco.com/who-invented-touch-screen-technology-1992535; see also Thompson,
supra note 290, at 40 (discussing NASA's "Technology Readiness Scale").
299. See, e.g., Sweeney, supra note 16, at 307-09 (arguing that (1) Stalled Patents must be
given to the public; and (2) because they are unlicensed, technology transfer revenues will be
unaffected).

300.
301.
302.

See Auerswald, supranote 292; Thompson, supranote 290, at 40-41, 44.
See supraPart II.A.
A patent term is generally twenty years; however, design patents have a shorter term

length of fifteen years. General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
(Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-conceming-patents#

heading-23. Thus, for Stalled Patents, the licensee may still enforce their monopoly up to a
maximum of fifteen years. See id.
303. See supraPart Ill.
304.

See supraPart III.

305.
306.

See supraPart III.
See supranotes 290-97 and accompanying text.
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technologies. This will increase both the likelihood that private industry
will license Stalled Patents from TTOs, and that those licenses will turn
into commercial products.30 7 This is consistent with the ultimate goal of
Bayh-Dole-introducing new products into society.3 0 s Importantly, the
same prohibition on universities assigning patents to non-practicing
entities will persist, thus eliminating the possibility that a university
assigns the rights to a patent troll.30 9 The march-in provision will also
remain in effect, so if the new licensee does not develop the technology
as expected, or is overcharging for the product, the license can be
revoked and a new partner can be sought.310
B. CreatingEconomic Incentives and Exploiting the Unique Structure
(andPlacement) on University Campuses Will Result in the Increased
Commercializationof Stalled Patents
It is the role of the TTO, often with the assistance of the inventor, to
determine potential commercial applications of basic research and
identify the best path to commercialization."' Prior to applying for a
patent, an employee of the TTO has met with the inventor-scientist in
order to (1) ensure that the proper disclosure statements are filed and (2)
explore any and all commercial applications of the technology.3 12
Typically this process continues throughout the patenting and
subsequent commercialization process.3 13 Regardless of whether the
inventor remains with the university, the information that the inventor
provided will always be available to employees of the TTO.3 14
Unlike individuals or private companies that "move on" from failed
research, the TTO has no reason to "move on" as its exclusive job is to
locate a licensee for patents in their portfolios.3 15 For better or worse,
the TTO is a part of technology transfer, and they will remain on

307. See supra notes 290-97 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
309. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(A) (2012). For a definition of patent trolls, see Marianna Galtstyan,
Who Are Patent Trolls & How Do They Work?, INVESTOPEDIA (July 15, 2015), http://www.
investopedia.com/articles/investing/071515/who-are-patent-trolls-how-do-they-work.asp.
310. See Allen, supra note 125.
311. See supraPart II.C.
312. See supraPart H.C.
313. See supraPart H.C.
314. See supraPart H.C.
315. See supraPart H.C.
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universities' campuses for the near future.316 In essence, the TTO is the
perfect-and perhaps only-entity that can assist in the
commercialization of Stalled Patents.3 17 Currently, TTOs have little or
no repercussions if they fail to locate licensees for their technology. 3 18
Even when TTOs generate licensing revenues, the universities are
prohibited from applying that revenue on budget shortfalls." 9 Subpart 1
proposes removing that limitation with regards to Stalled Patents.320 This
will result in TTOs taking a more active approach to licensing Stalled
Patents, increasing the likelihood of locating a successful licensee.32
Finally, Subpart 2 proposes funding a university "commercialization
pilot program," where the funding is contingent on universities
demonstrating a plan to commercialize Stalled Patents.322
1. By Removing the Limitation That Revenue Cannot Be Used
to Cover Budget Shortfalls, the Proposed Amendment Will
Capitalize on Both the Unique Structure of Technology
Transfer Offices and Their Place in Universities
Currently, universities, the government, and the public are
receiving nothing in return for their investment in Stalled Patents. 32 3 The
drafters of the Bayh-Dole Act had a grand vision that the revenue
from licensed patents would fund new research and education.324
Unfortunately, for Stalled Patents, reaching that vision is impossible.3 25
Stalled Patents are unlicensed technologies and, therefore, generate zero
dollars in licensing revenues to fund future research and education on
university campuses. 326
Thus, removing this spending prohibition for Stalled Patents does
not result in a net loss to the public or the university.327 Conversely,
eliminating the provision provides a new chance that Stalled Patents are

316.

See supra Part II.C.

317.

See supra Part I.C.

318.

See supra Part III.

319.
320.
321.
322.

See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(C) (2012).
See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part V.B.1.
See infra Part V.B.2.

323.

See supra Part Ell.

324. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(C).
325. See supraPart m.
326. See supra Part III. In order for a TTO to receive revenue on a patent, it must be licensed.
35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7). Stalled Patents are not licensed; thus, currently there are no revenues to
invest in furthering science and technology. See id.
327. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7); see also supra notes 233-40 and accompanying text.
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commercialized.3 28 Considering that currently that chance is essentially
zero, any increase must be welcomed.3 2 9 Moreover, the goal of
Bayh-Dole to introduce new products into society now becomes a
legitimate possibility. 330
TTOs typically report to the trustees or administrators of
universities, or in some cases, to the president of the university. 331

Regardless, both parties are acutely aware of the continued losses that
most TTOs incur.3 32 If university administrators believe that (1) there is
a significant potential for commercial revenue in Stalled Patents-which
there is-and (2) all licensing revenues from Stalled Patents can be used
to cover budget shortfalls, they will apply external pressure on the TTOs
to review Stalled Patents for possible new commercial applications.33 3
This pressure will be exacerbated due to the typical budget constraints
that universities are currently facing.334 That pressure will provide what
the march-in provision will never accomplish-a legitimate negative
consequence to the TTO (and its employees) if commercialization
efforts are not fruitful.335
One could argue that the added financial incentive and increased
pressure from university officials would result in very aggressive
TTOs. 33 6 However, nearly all criticisms of overly aggressive TTOs result
from universities over-patenting or universities that actively seek
infringement suits. 337 These behaviors occur regardless of this proposal
and, more importantly, will not be increased as a result of this

328.

See supraPart IV.

329.

See supranotes 233-40 and accompanying text.

330.

See supraPart III.

331. See Abrams et al., supra note 176, at 24-25, 24 tbl.5 (finding that about half of the TTOs
reported directly to administration, and about one-third reported directly to the president of the
university).
332. See, e.g., SCHACHT, supra note 16, at 19; see also Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 358-61.

333. See Abrams et al., supra note 176, at 34 tbl. 12 (showing that revenue maximization is an
important driver of technology transfer).
334. Terran Lane, On Leaving Academe, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 9, 2012), http://

chronicle.com/article/On-Leaving-Academe/133717

(describing the current "budget climate" at

universities).

335. See supra Part III.B.
336. See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 172, at 2179-80 (discussing one survey that found TTOs tend
to place more emphasis on revenue and slightly less emphasis on "importance of commercialization
of inventions"). But see Abrams et al., supra note 176, at 34 tbl.12 (finding that revenue
maximization was the third most important factor that motivated TTOs).
337. See de Larena, supra note 15, at 1417-19 (summarizing questionable licensing procedures
from universities).
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amendment.338 In fact, the only side effect of this amendment will
339
be that TTOs may aggressively seek new licensing agreements.
Under Bayh-Dole, licensing agreements are the only way new products
are introduced into society, thus this active response is actually a
desirable outcome.34 0
2. The Government Can Incentivize Universities to
Actively Review Their Portfolios of Stalled Patents by
Encouraging Technology Transfer Offices to Take Advantage
of Their Place on University Campuses
Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in order to commercialize
government-funded technology, introduce new products into society,
and rebuild American industry.34 ' Today, "business deaths now outpace
business births worldwide."34 2 Commercializing Stalled Patents will
result in new businesses, helping to spur new economic growth.343
According to Steve Case, founder of Revolution Ventures and
former member of then-President Obama's Council on Jobs and
Competitiveness, "[i]n order for America to maintain its position as the
most innovative and entrepreneurial nation, we must win the global
battle for talent, and create pathways for fledgling startups to become
iconic American businesses." 3 44
In 2015, Senators Jerry Moran and Mark R. Warner "introduced the
fourth version of their Startup Act-a piece of legislation they have been
lobbying for and tinkering with for more than three years."3 45 The
Startup Act proposed significant changes to the immigration and tax
systems in order to spur entrepreneurship.3 46 Senator Warner stated that
the proposed bill would "devote more federal funding to help American
universities more quickly commercialize technology and inventions

338.
339.
340.
341.

See id.
See McManis & Yagi, supra note 20, at 1057-58.
See 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2012); supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.

342. See J.D. Harrison, Senators Take Another Shot at Startup Act, Pitching Tax Tweaks and
Immigration Reform, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business

lon-small-business/senators-take-another-shot-at-startup-act-pitching-tax-tweaks-and-immigrationreform/2015/01/16/3ff2a584-9dbl- lle4-a7ee-526210d665b4 story.html?utmterm=.807038fafcOf.
343.

See supra Part II.

344. See Harrison,supra note 342.
345. Id.
346. Startup Act, S. 181, 114th Cong. (2015).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

41

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 10

1058

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 45:1017

spawned by on-campus research."347 Senator Warner considered this
feature to be the most valuable part of the bill. 348 The proposed bill
directs the Secretary of Commerce to use certain federal agency
extramural budget funds to "award grants to institutions of higher
education . . for initiatives to improve commercialization and transfer
of technology." 3 49
This Note goes further, proposing that universities must prove that
they have plans in place to actively review and commercialize their
existing portfolio of Stalled Patents in order to receive additional
funding for commercialization. It is possible that this funded mandate
will supply TTOs with the necessary resources to actively review their
portfolio of Stalled Patents.350 in essence, a small additional investment
by taxpayers earmarked for the commercialization of Stalled Patents
may be necessary for society (and the university) to receive any return
on their initial investment.3 1

Consistent with Bayh-Dole, universities will be free to choose what
"plan" they propose to license and commercialize Stalled Patents.3 52 One
suggestion-which requires minimal investment-suggests that
universities encourage both Master of Business Administration
("M.B.A.") and Juris Doctor candidates to participate in technology
transfer.3 5 3 These students can review a TTO's portfolio of Stalled
Patents, identify technology that may have new commercial applications,
and prepare market analyses on said technology.3 54 The law students can
provide legal assistance to both the TTO employees and the inventor (if
still employed by the university).3 55 In addition, the students will very
347. Harrison, supra note 342.
348. Id. (noting Senator Warner stated that the increased federal funding part of the proposed
bill receives little attention but is "one of the most valuable parts of the bill").
349. S. 181 § 8(b)(2)(A)(i).
350. See supra Part III.
351. See supra Part III.
352. See supra Parts 11-111.
353. See infra note 359.
354.

See,

e.g.,

About

OTC:

Job Postings, U.

MINN.,

http://www.research.umn.edu/

techcomm/jobs.html#.Us2fnvRDvso (last visited Apr. 10, 2017) (describing that M.B.A. students
can assess the commercial viability of new inventions, develop marketing materials, and identify
potential licensees).
355.

See CTV Fellows Program, COLUM.: TECH. VENTURES, http://techventures.columbia.edu

/about-ctv/ctv-fellows-program (last visited Apr. 10, 2017) ("Fellows gain exposure to intellectual
property, marketing, management, editing, and licensing research."); Entrepreneurship and
Intellectual Property Clinical Practicum, MAURICE A. DEANE SCH. L. HOFSTRA U.,

http://law.hofstra.edu/clinics/entrepreneurshipandintellectualpropertyclinicalpracticum/ (last visited
Apr. 10, 2017) ("Students in the Entrepreneurship and Intellectual Property Clinical Practicum
provide transactional (non-litigation) assistance to small businesses and start-up companies, with a
particular focus on intellectual property issues that arise for start-ups in the earliest stages of venture
formation.").
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often have access to the inventor-scientist, which increases the
likelihood that the technology is commercialized.356 It is even possible
that the students can join new businesses centered on these
technologies.3 5 7 M.B.A. students are constantly drafting new business
plans and analyzing business proposals as a requirement of their
degree.358 Therefore, offering practical, real-world experience can only
maximize the students' educational experience and provide potential
upside for universities.
Some schools have implemented similar-and successfulprograms, but the programs are not dedicated to commercializing Stalled
Patents. 35 9 As a result, and similar to TTO employees, the students'
efforts are primarily dedicated to emerging technology. However, an
increase in funding for such programs-some of which is earmarked for
commercializing Stalled Patents-will only result in a greater chance of
commercializing both emerging technology and Stalled Patents, which
in turn can only benefit society.
V.

CONCLUSION

Recent publications affirm the notion that the government's
enormous investment in technology created the foundation for many of
the innovative products and services in today's society. 360 However,
government funding cannot spur technological growth on its own;
"[b]oth government research and entrepreneurial capital are necessary

356. See supranotes 94-98 and accompanying text.
357. CTV Fellows Program,supra note 355 ("[Columbia Technlogy Venture] Fellows pursue
exciting careers at the intersection of science, technology, business, and law. Over 160 Alumni have
worked at companies including BM, Bristol Myers-Squibb, Allied Minds, McKinsey, Merck,
Samsung Ventures, at various law firms and startups, and at universities such as UCLA, Harvard,
NYU, and the University of Vermont.").
358. See, e.g., id.; Jeremy Ferguson, First Year MBA Experience: Preparingfor the Business
Plan Competition, B.C. CAROLL SCH. MGMT.: BC MBA ADMISSIONS BLOG (Jan. 20, 2015),

http://carrollschoolblog.bc.edu/blog/first-year-mba-experience-preparing-for-the-business-plancompetition.
359. E.g., CTVFellows Program, supra note 355. For example:

The Columbia Technology Ventures Fellows Program is a globally-recognized
Fellowship that gives Columbia graduate students and post-docs hands-on experience
working on early stage technology assessments, writing marketing abstracts, and

preparing marketing campaigns.... Fellows work closely with CTV on a part-time,
remote basis. The Program is intended to enhance our understanding of the commercial
potential of Columbia technologies, while providing Fellows a valuable educational
experience.

Id.
360.

See supra Parts I-II.
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conditions for the advance of commercial innovation."361 The Bayh-Dole
Act created a system that (1) ensured private industry had easy access to
government-funded research and (2) provided economic incentives for
both universities and private industry to commercialize that research.362
For many inventions, this system resulted in innovative products that are
changing America for the better.3 63 But "[t]axpayers have a large,
unacknowledged role in the nation's innovation."3 64 Part of that role is
ensuring taxpayers receive the greatest return for their investment in
science and technology.3 65 Thus, any proposal with the potential to do
so-especially in light of the current treatment of Stalled Patents-must
be taken seriously.3 6 6
Due to nobody's fault in particular, Stalled Patents exist in the
portfolios of every TTO. Now is the time to "double down" on BayhDole by providing universities funds in order to review their portfolio of
Stalled Patents. Over thirty-five years ago, Congress expressed concern
that "unused patents . . . represent[ed] a partial waste of our vast research
and development programs and their development will insure that the
public is receiving the full benefits of this taxpayer-supported effort."36 7
Today, that same problem exists.3 68 Even more troubling, under current
law, there is virtually no chance that new products and services are
introduced into society based on these Stalled Patents.3 69 This Note
proposes an amendment to existing legislation that will provide a
significant increase in the likelihood that Stalled Patents become the
foundation for new and innovative products that are ultimately utilized
by the original funders-taxpayers.3 70 The proposal ensures that TTOs
mount a second bona fide effort to commercialize Stalled Patents.37 1
Although the possibilities of new innovations being introduced to
society based on Stalled Patents may be limited, the societal benefits of a

361.

Jeff Madrick, Innovation: The Government Was Crucial After All, N.Y. REV. BOOKS

(Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/04/24/innovation-government-was-crucialafter-all.

362.
363.

See supraParts 11-111.
See supranotes 1-3, 227 and accompanying text.

364.
365.

See Porter,supra note 3.
See supraParts i-IV.

366.
367.

See supraParts HI-IV.
S. REP. No. 96-480, at 30 (1979).

368.

See supraPart III.

369.
370.
371.

See supranotes 265-66, 323-27 and accompanying text.
See supraPart IV.
See supraPart IV.
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new Google or cancer-fighting drug make this proposal worthwhiletaxpayers deserve that opportunity.372
DanielE. Stern*

372. Valdivia, supra note 23, at 11-12, 11 tbl.2 (finding that even the TTOs with the most
limited budget have a legitimate chance of finding a blockbuster).
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